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"[Tihe very essence of a healthy federalism depends upon the avoid-
ance of needless conflict between state and federal courts .....
Federal-state cooperation in the solution of crime under constitu-
tional standards will be promoted, if only by recognition of their now
mutual obligation to respect the same fundamental criteria in their
approaches.'
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1. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 657-58 (1961) (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364
U.S. 206, 221 (1960)).
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INTRODUCTION
More than thirty years have passed since the United States
Supreme Court made these observations in the landmark case of
Mapp v. Ohio.' The Court, no doubt, thought it was putting an end to
the wrenching problems that developed since it laid the groundwork
for the exclusionary rule in Boyd v. United States in 1886.3 Although
the merits of the exclusionary rule have been debated for many years
and will be debated for years to come, the advent of the exclusionary
rule raised important issues of federalism that were not resolved
easily.
An examination of the cases decided prior to 1961 and the schol-
arly comment of that time reveals that, after a substantial period
of conflict between state and federal constitutional jurisprudence,
it became very apparent that there was a need for both state and fed-
eral courts to respect "the same fundamental criteria in their
approaches."4
The Mapp decision harmonized federal and state constitutional
principles and effectively eliminated these problems. In recent years,
however, a "New Federalism"5 has emerged that has once again led to
inconsistencies and conflicts between state and federal constitutional
law in the area of criminal procedure. This New Federalism is the
expression of state courts' increasing tendency to interpret their con-
stitutions to provide individuals with greater rights than those guaran-
teed by the United States Constitution. Difficult issues such as the
silver platter doctrine, thought by the Mapp Court to have been per-
manently eliminated, have returned as a result of this approach.
Regardless of the merits of New Federalism,6 the increasing fragmen-
2. Id.
3. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
4. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 658.
5. See infra notes 64-67 and accompanying text.
6. The merits of New Federalism have been ably and extensively debated by others.
See, e.g., William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of the Individual, 90
-ARv. L. REv. 489, 491 (1977) (contending that state courts should expand the protections
afforded under the federal Constitution, looking to "[s]tate constitutions ... [as] a font of
individual liberties"); Ronald KL. Collins, Reliance on State Constitutions-The Montana Dis-
aster, 63 TEX. L. REv. 1095, 1137 (1985) (arguing that "[t]extual similarities between state
and federal law do not justify the abdication of an obligation duly imposed on state judges
to be the final arbiters of state law");Jill E. Fisch, Turf Wars: Federal-State Cooperation and the
Reverse Silver Platter Doctrine, 23 CRiM. L. BuL. 509, 531-32 (1987) (calling for federal legis-
lation requiring universal standards when federal and state interpretations of constitu-
tional criminal procedure differ); PeterJ. Galie, The Other Supreme Courts: Judicial Activism
Among State Supreme Courts, 33 SYRAcusE L. REv. 731, 792-93 (1982) (inviting scholars to
examine and comment on New Federalism); James A. Gardner, The Failed Discourse of State
Constitutionalism, 90 MIcH. L. REv. 761, 764-65 (1992) (criticizing state courts for failing to
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tation of our federal and state constitutional jurisprudence may prove
once again to be unhealthy or even disastrous for our system of
federalism.
This Article begins with an examination of the inconsistencies
and conflicts that arose between state and federal constitutional prin-
ciples before the 1961 decision in Mapp v. Ohio.7 Next, it reviews the
develop an intelligible discourse on state constitutional law); Ken Gormley, The Penn-
sylvania Constitution After Edmunds, 3 WIDENFRJ. PUB. L. 55, 58 (1993) (favoring the devel-
opment of New Federalism in Pennsylvania after the state court rejected the United States
Supreme Court's good faith exception to the exclusionary rule); Helen Hershkoff, State
Constitutions: A National Perspective, 3 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 7, 24 (1993) (noting that state
courts use the distinctive features of state constitutions to expand protections of civil liber-
ties); Barry Latzer, The New Judicial Federalism and Criminal Justice: Two Problems and a Re-
sponse, 22 RUTGERS L.J. 863, 885-86 (1991) (expressing general approval of New Federalism
while advocating reliance on federal constitutional principles in conflict-of-law cases); Earl
M. Maltz, False Prophet-Justice Brennan and the Theony of State Constitutional Law, 15 HA~srNGS
CONST. L.Q. 429, 449 (1988) [hereinafter Maltz, False Prophet] (criticizing New Federalism
for promoting unjustified state court activism and distorting state constitutional analysis);
Earl M. Maltz, TheDark Side of State Court Activism, 63 TEX. L. Rv. 995, 1023 (1985) [herein-
after Maltz, The Dark Side] (opposing value-based state court review); Kenneth J. Melilli,
Exclusion of Evidence in Federal Prosecutions on the Basis of State Law, 22 GA. L. REV. 667, 739
(1988) (opposing use of state constitutional law to determine the admissibility of evidence
in federal criminal cases); MaryJane Morrison, Choice of Law for Unlawful Searches, 41 OKLA.
L. REv. 579, 632-35 (1988) (calling on state courts to use their constitutions to expand
protections); Stewart G. Pollock, State Constitutions as Separate Sources of Fundamental Rights,
35 RUTGERS L. Rav. 707 (1983) (challenging the legal community to develop a more pre-
dictable state constitutional jurisprudence); Leonard Sosnov, Criminal Procedure Rights
Under the Pennsylvania Constitution: Examining the Present and Exploring the Future, 3 WIDENER
J. PUB. L. 217 (1993) (favoring the continued development of New Federalism in Penn-
sylvania); Donald E. Wilkes, Jr., The New Federalism in Criminal Procedure: State Court Evasion
of the Burger Court, 62 Ky. L.J. 421 (1974) (recognizing the importance of state courts in
limiting the power of state government); Robert F. Williams, In the Supreme Court's Shadow:
Legitimacy of State Rejection of Supreme Court Reasoning and Result, 35 S.C. L. REv. 353, 402
(1984) (arguing that state court freedom to disagree with the United States Supreme
Court is a basic tenet of federalism); Tom Quigley, Comment, Do Silver Platters Have a Place
in State-Federal Relations? Using Illegally Obtained Evidence in Criminal Prosecutions, 20 ARiz.
ST. L.J. 285, 325 (1988) (arguing for the application of the exclusionary rule of the state
where a search occurs rather than the federal rule); Developments in the Law-The Inteipreta-
tion of State Constitutional Rights, 95 HARv. L. REY. 1324, 1357 (1982) [hereinafter The Inter-
pretation of State Constitutional Rights] (promoting state constitutional law as serving an
interstitial role); Jose L. Fernandez, Note, The New Jersey Supreme Court's Interpretation and
Application of the State Constitution, 15 RUTGERS LJ. 491, 510-11 (1984) (criticizing the uncer-
tainty of the New Jersey Supreme Court's approach in deciding whether to use federal
standards or apply independent state constitutional grounds); Ronald S. Range, Note, Re-
verse Silver Platter: Should Evidence That State Officils Obtained in Violation of a State Constitu-
tion Be Admissible in a Federal Criminal Tria:4 45 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1499, 1526 (1988)
(arguing that federal courts should apply state exclusionary rules to actions by state offi-
cials). Commentators have noted that individual philosophy influences one's view of New
Federalism. See Latzer, supra, at 863-65; see also Brennan, supra, at 502; Wilkes, supra, at 425,
434-35.
7. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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success of the Mapp decision in resolving these conflicts and the
reemergence of these issues under New Federalism. The Article then
examines the theoretical and practical problems created by these in-
consistencies and the dangers that they pose to our constitutional ju-
risprudence in the area of criminal procedure. Finally, the Article
discusses the future of constitutional criminal procedure.
I. CONSTITUTIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE BEFORE IAPP V. OHIO
At the turn of the century, federal and state jurisprudence regard-
ing the exclusionary rule was consistent: there was no exclusionary
rule and illegally obtained evidence was admissible in both federal
and state courts.8 Although the United States Supreme Court had
hinted in 1886 that a federal exclusionary rule might be on the hori-
zon,9 in 1904 the Court reaffirmed that evidence seized in violation of
the Constitution was admissible in federal courts. 10
All of this changed dramatically with the Court's 1914 decision in
Weeks v. United States. 1 In Weeks, the Court held for the first time that
evidence seized by federal officials in violation of the Fourth Amend-
ment was inadmissible in federal courts.12 Although Weeks is
remembered primarily as the case that gave birth to the exclusionary
rule, the decision contained another equally important rule. The
Court specifically held that its newly established exclusionary rule was
only a federal exclusionary rule. The rule applied only to evidence
seized by federal officials and offered in federal court. It did not ap-
ply to items illegally seized by state officials,"3 nor did it apply to evi-
dence seized by a federal official and offered in state court. Evidence
illegally seized by a federal official continued to be admissible in state
court as long as the state had not established its own exclusionary
rule. 4 Although the first exclusionary rule cases decided by the
8. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Tibbetts, 32 N.E. 910 (Mass. 1893) (holding that incrim-
inating letters discovered during a search were admissible as evidence although they were
unrelated to the purpose of the search warrant).
9. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886) (holding that in a forfeiture action
the court cannot compel the defendant or claimant to comply with an order for
information).
10. Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 585, 597-98 (1904) (reaffirming that an illegal search
would not result in exclusion of evidence).
11. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
12. Id. at 398.
13. Id.
14. Id.; see also Wilson v. Schnettler, 365 U.S. 381, 385-88 (1961) (holding that state
courts determine whether evidence seized by federal agents is admissible in their courts).
226 [VOL. 55:223
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Supreme Court after Weeks dealt with other issues,' 5 it soon became
apparent that this disparate treatment of federal and state officials in
both federal and state courts opened a Pandora's box of problems.
The first Supreme Court case to deal with these problems was
Byars v. United States. 6 In Byars, the Court had to decide whether the
Weeks exclusionary rule should be applied to evidence seized unlaw-
fully by state officers who were cooperating with federal officials. t7
The Court reiterated that evidence seized illegally by state officials
could be used by federal prosecutors against defendants in federal
cases.'" Such evidence, however, would be excluded if federal agents
participated in the wrongful search and seizure.' 9 This decision
raised more questions than it answered, leaving the courts to deter-
mine the nature and extent of federal participation required to
trigger the application of the federal exclusionary rule. Not surpris-
ingly, subsequent decisions were confusing and, in many cases,
contradictory.2
0
15. See, e.g., Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475 (1921) (holding that the Weeks
exclusionary rule would not apply to seizures by private individuals); Gouled v. United
States, 255 U.S. 298, 306 (1921) (holding that items obtained by stealth, rather than by
forcible entry, will be subject to the exclusionary rule); Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United
States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920) (establishing what later became known as the "fruit of the
poisonous tree doctrine").
16. 273 U.S. 28 (1927).
17. Id. at 33.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. See United States v. Moses, 234 F.2d 124, 126-27 (7th Cir. 1956) (discussing the
contradictory nature of these cases); see also Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74, 78-79
(1949) (excluding evidence where a federal officer alerted state officials to illegal activi-
ties); Gambino v. United States, 275 U.S. 310, 317 (1927) (holding that seizure of liquor by
state officers for a federal prosecution would result in exclusion even if no federal officers
were present); United States v. White, 228 F.2d 832, 835 (7th Cir. 1956) (holding that
evidence obtained illegally by local police officers was admissible in federal court absent
complicity by federal officials); Watson v. United States, 224 F.2d 910, 913 (5th Cir. 1955)
(holding that the federal exclusionary rule did not apply to a liquor seizure by local police
that federal prosecutors sought to introduce in federal court); Williams v. United States,
215 F.2d 695, 696-97 (9th Cir. 1954) (holding that the Fourth Amendment did not apply in
a federal criminal trial to state officers' seizure of a gun); Shelton v. United States, 169 F.2d
665, 668 (D.C. Cir. 1948) (finding that the federal exclusionary rule would not apply to
state officers' seizure of two forged driver's permits adduced in a federal criminal trial);
Lotto v. United States, 157 F.2d 623, 626-27 (8th Cir. 1946) (holding that federal prosecu-
tors can use evidence improperly seized by state officers only on their own account), cert.
denied, 330 U.S. 811 (1947); United States v. Pugliese, 153 F.2d 497, 499 (2d Cir. 1945)
(holding that the exclusionary rule will apply only if state officers are controlled by, or
responsible to, the prosecution); Sutherland v. United States, 92 F.2d 305, 308 (4th Cir.
1937) (finding sufficient general cooperation between state and federal officials to find
federal action in illegal search by state officers); Fowler v. United States, 62 F.2d 656, 657
(7th Cir. 1932) (holding that existence of an agreement between city police and federal
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Two anomalous Supreme Court decisions amply illustrate the
problems that arose from the practice of federal officers introducing
illegally seized evidence into state courts. In Rea v. United States,21 a
federal court initially suppressed items illegally seized by a federal
agent.22 Thereafter, when the agent swore to a complaint against the
same defendant in a state case in New Mexico,23 the United States
Supreme Court enjoined the agent from testifying in the state court.24
Conversely, the Court in Wilson v. Schnettler25 refused to enjoin federal
agents from testifying in state proceedings where no prior federal
court order existed. 2' The determination of whether a federal officer
could testify in state court thus depended solely on whether the mat-
ter was litigated first in federal court.27 Because in most cases federal
officials decide whether to initiate a case in federal or state court, a
Rea injunction effectively could be avoided merely by going directly to
state court.
The conundrums created by these differences did not go unno-
ticed by the commentators of the day.2 8 Calls to eliminate disparate
officers giving federal prosecutors first opportunity to charge defendants under federal law
justified finding federal action in illegal state search).
21. 350 U.S. 214 (1956).
22. Id. at 215.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 217.
25. 365 U.S. 381 (1961).
26. Id. at 387.
27. Id. at 387-88. The Wilson Court also noted that lack of probable cause was not
alleged; however, this did not appear to be determinative. Id. at 388.
28. See Francis A. Allen, The Wolf Case: Search and Seizure, Federalism, and the Civil Liber-
ties, 45 ILL. L. REv. 1, 23 (1950) (noting that the difficulties in showing a tainted search may
encourage federal officials to cooperate with state officers as a convenient device to avoid
the exclusionary rule); Julius Berman & Paul Oberst, Admissibility of Evidence Obtained by an
Unconstitutional Search and Seizure---Federal Problems, 55 Nw. U. L. RE,. 525, 551 (1960) (pre-
dicting that rejection of the silver platter doctrine in Elkins would motivate resolution of
conflicts involving both the reverse silver platter doctrine and the exclusionary rule); Ger-
ald H. Galler, The Exclusion of Illegal State Evidence in Federal Courts, 49 J. CraM. L., CRIMINOL-
OCY & POLICE ScL 455, 460 (1959) (calling for uniform application of the exclusionary rule
because "illegal actions on the part of state and federal officers are equally repugnant to
the federal constitution"); JAC. Grant, The Tarnished Silver Platter: Federalism and Admissi-
bility of Illegally Seized Evidence, 8 UCLA L. REv. 1, 42-43 (1961) (recommending that a com-
mittee analyze the distinctions between unconstitutional and illegal searches and seizures,
rather than allowing courts to decide the differences on an ad hoc basis); Yale Kamisar,
Wolf and Lustig Ten Years Later: Illegal State Evidence in State and Federal Courts, 43 MINN. L.
REv. 1083, 1194-95 (1959) (noting that abolition of the silver platter doctrine would en-
courage federal and state officials to work together to protect individual liberties rather
than inviting illegality in their cooperation); Alan C. Kohn, Admissibility in Federal Court of
Evidence Illegally Seized by State Officers, 1959 WASH. U. L.Q. 229, 253 (stating that "[s]erious
impairment of federal law enforcement could result if state officers, during investigation of
state crimes which overlap federal crimes, commit an illegal search and seizure"); Judson
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treatment came as early as 1948.29 Authors noted that the large over-
lap in federal and state criminal laws provided opportunities for fo-
rum selection and cooperation between federal and state officials in
circumventing the federal exclusionary rule."° These commentators
also recognized that serious problems arose under specific circum-
stances, such as when state officials testifying in federal court were not
bound by the federal exclusionary rule," when federal officials were
able to offer illegally seized evidence in state proceedings,3 2 and when
state officials were permitted to introduce illegally seized evidence in
the courts of another state.33 These problems came to be designated
A. Parsons, Jr., State-Federal Crossfire in Search and Seizure and Self Incrimination, 42 CORNELL
L.Q. 346, 349 (1957) (predicting that the availability of state prosecution may lessen fed-
eral officers' motivation to obtain valid search warrants, and may even tempt them to act
wrongfully); Comment, Judicial Control of Illegal Search and Seizure, 58 YALE LJ. 144, 159
(1948) [hereinafter Judicial Control] (noting that regardless of the official stance,
"[r]outine acceptance and use of tainted evidence secured by another agency encourages
illegal search to the same extent as would a prior agreement"); Comment, The Benanti
Case: State Wiretap Evidence and the Federal Exclusionary Rule 57 COLUM. L. REv. 1159, 1169-
70 (1957) [hereinafter The Benanti Case]; Ivon B. Blum, Case Note, Search and Seizure:
Evidence: Admissibility in Federal Courts of Evidence Unlawfully Seized by State Officers, 6 UCLA L.
REv. 703, 706-07 (1959) (asserting that the Supreme Court's inconsistent approach toward
unlawful state seizure of evidence results in due process violations just as reprehensible as
the coercion of confessions); Case Note, Constitutional Law--Admissibility in Federal Prosecu-
tion of Evidence Obtained from Illegal Search and Seizure by State Agents, 46 IowA L. REv. 469,
470-71 (1961) (criticizing the federal courts' use of the silver platter doctrine); Note, The
Weeks-Wolf Dilemma: Illegal State Evidence in Federal Courts, 46 VA. L. REv. 587, 594 (1960)
(noting that a uniform exclusionary rule in the federal courts would obviate the difficulties
in delineating between collaboration and true "silver platter" evidence).
29. See Judicial Control, supra note 28, at 158-60 (opposing the limitation on the use of
the exclusionary rule solely for illegal searches made by officials of the prosecuting
government).
30. See Kamisar, supra note 28, at 1187-90 (noting that a system of cooperative federal-
ism had developed in law enforcement that was not recognized by the public or the
courts); Kohn, supra note 28, at 253-55 (pointing out the overlap between state and federal
criminal laws and the temptation for state officials to engage in illegal searches and
seizures).
31. Allen, supra note 28, at 22-23 (noting that this doctrine can cause federal officials to
encourage state officials to seize evidence illegally); Kamisar, supra note 28, at 1129-45
(calling for a reexamination of the silver platter doctrine in light of recent Supreme Court
decisions); The Benanti Case, supra note 28, at 1170 (arguing that this doctrine allows tacit
agreements whereby state officials can accomplish prohibited federal action).
32. Berman & Oberst, supra note 28, at 547-49 (considering the approaches of the
various states to the admissibility of evidence illegally seized by federal officials); Parsons,
supra note 28, at 348-49 (reviewing state cases and concluding that federal officials may be
tempted to act wrongfully to aid state officers).
33. See Berman & Oberst, supra note 28, at 529-33, 549-51 (reviewing the development
of state exclusionary rules and discussing the problems of presenting evidence illegally
obtained in one state in another state); Galler, supra note 28, at 459 n.23 (noting dispari-
ties among states regarding the admissibility of evidence seized in other states).
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as, respectively, the silver platter doctrine, 4 the reverse silver platter
doctrine, 5 and the interstate silver platter doctrine. 6 For purposes of
this Article, they will all be referred to as the silver platter doctrine.
Commentators noted the perils inherent in courts' increasing use of
injunctions to prevent law enforcement officers from testifying in the
courts of other jurisdictions. 37
These issues presented seemingly insoluble problems."8 Matters
were further complicated by the fact that individual states were adopt-
ing different approaches to the exclusionary rule.3" It became appar-
ent, to both the courts and the commentators, that these issues had to
be resolved and there was only one solution-the harmonization of
federal and state jurisprudence governing the exclusionary rule.4" In
1960 the United States Supreme Court took a step in that direction.
Exercising its supervisory powers, the Court held that evidence seized
by state officers in violation of the Fourth Amendment was not admis-
sible in federal court.4" The possibility remained, however, that fed-
eral officers could introduce illegally seized evidence in state courts.
34. Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74, 78-79 (1949); Allen, supra note 28, at 22;
Kamisar, supra note 28, at 1129-30.
35. Berman & Oberst, supra note 28, at 547-49.
36. Id. at 549-51.
37. See Galler, supra note 28, at 459 n.23 (discussing problems regarding states' efforts
to limit admissibility of illegally seized evidence in other state and federal courts); Parsons,
supra note 28, at 346, 357-63 (examining the potential difficulties arising out of one court
enjoining a law enforcement officer from testifying in another court).
38. See Grant, supra note 28, at 2-20 (reviewing important cases that gave rise to the
exclusionary rule and the problems created by the silver platter doctrine); Kohn, supra
note 28, at 230-44 (summarizing the development of the exclusionary rule on the federal
level).
39. See, e.g., People v. Cahan, 282 P.2d 905, 915 (Cal. 1955) (en banc) (establishing an
exclusionary rule based on the California Constitution); Eleuteri v. Richman, 141 A.2d 46,
52 (NJ.) (holding that, except when constitutional rights are plainly flouted, illegally
seized evidence will be admitted in New Jersey state courts), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 843
(1958); People v. Defore, 150 N.E. 585 (N.Y.) (holding that illegally seized evidence would
be admitted in New York state courts), cert. denied, 270 U.S. 657 (1926); State v. Hillman,
125 A.2d 94, 96 (R.I. 1956) (holding that a statute excluding illegally seized evidence
would be applied prospectively); see also Berman & Oberst, supra note 28, at 529-33, 549-51
(reviewing the approaches of various states to the exclusionary rule and the problems cre-
ated by their differing approaches); Galler, supra note 28, at 459 n.23 (discussing the diffi-
culties created by disparate state approaches to the exclusionary rule).
40. See Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 221 (1960) ("The very essence of a healthy
federalism depends upon the avoidance of needless conflict between state and federal
courts."); see also Grant, supra note 28, at 42-43 (calling for the appointment of a committee
to study the possibility of giving uniformity to the application of the exclusionary rule);
Judicial Control, supra note 28, at 160 (advocating that the exclusionary rule be regarded by
courts "as a method of reinforcing a constitutionally guaranteed immunity free of unre-
lated doctrine").
41. Rios v. United States, 364 U.S. 253, 255 (1960); Elkins, 364 U.S. at 223.
230 [VOL. 55:223
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Also, the difficulties that resulted from the states' conflicting ap-
proaches to the exclusionary rule were still not resolved. Final resolu-
tion of these complex problems would have to wait until 1961.42
II. THE M4.PPDECISION
Mapp v. Ohid"5 is known as the case in which Fourth Amendment
protections,' including the exclusionary rule, were extended to the
states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.4 5 Mapp is an important case in several other respects,46 not the
least of which is the reestablishment of harmony between federal and
state jurisprudence.47 Before Mapp, federal and state courts were in
conflict on the application of the exclusionary rule.48 The states also
disagreed over whether and how the exclusionary rule should be ap-
plied.49 This hodgepodge of conflicting approaches and opinions
had serious theoretical and practical implications.
It was difficult to justify a system where federal officers could not
use illegally seized evidence in federal court but could walk across the
street and use the evidence in state court.50 Likewise, it was not logi-
42. For a detailed account of the development of the federal exclusionary rule, see
Michael K. Schneider, Comment, An Exdusionaiy Ruk Colorado Can Call Its Own, 63 U.
COLO. L REv. 207, 209-19 (1992) (advocating additional applications of New Federalism in
Colorado).
43. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
44. The Fourth Amendment of the Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no War-
rants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
45. 367 U.S. at 654-55; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Section 1 reads in perti-
nent part, "nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law." Id. In Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), the Court applied the Fourth
Amendment to the states but did not extend the application of the exclusionary rule.
46. Justice Black provided the fifth vote for the majority but wrote a separate opinion
based largely on the Fifth Amendment. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 643, 661-66 (Black, J., concur-
ring). The dissent pointed out that certiorari had been granted only to determine the
constitutionality of the Ohio obscenity statute, yet the majority decided the case on an
issue not presented by the parties. Id. at 672-77 (Harlan, J., dissenting); see also PHILLIP E.
JOHNSON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 47 (2d ed. 1994).
47. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 657-58.
48. See supra notes 11-39 and accompanying text.
49. See supra note 39.
50. This situation persisted until Mapp v. Ohio, when the Court noted:
In non-exclusionary States, federal officers, being human, were by it [the double
standard] invited to and did, as our cases indicate, step across the street to the
State's attorney with their unconstitutionally seized evidence. Prosecution on the
basis of that evidence was then had in a state court in utter disregard of the en-
1996]
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cal for federal courts to admit evidence seized illegally by state offi-
cials, while excluding evidence illegally seized by federal officials.51 It
was also difficult to rationalize situations in which a state would ex-
clude evidence illegally seized by its own officers but admit evidence
illegally seized by federal officers or officers of another state.52 On a
forceable Fourth Amendment. If the fruits of an unconstitutional search had
been inadmissible in both state and federal courts, this inducement to evasion
would have been sooner eliminated. There would be no need to reconcile such
cases as Rea and Schnettler, each pointing up the hazardous uncertainties of our
heretofore ambivalent approach.
Mapp, 367 U.S. at 658.
51. This contradictory practice was permitted until the Court's decisions in Elkins v.
United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960), and Rios v. United States, 364 U.S. 253 (1960); and was
finally laid to rest by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). The Elkins Court recognized the
illogic of this situation:
If resolution of the issue were to be dictated solely by principles of logic, it is clear
what our decision would have to be. For surely no distinction can logically be
drawn between evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment and
that obtained in violation of the Fourteenth. The Constitution is flouted equally
in either case. To the victim it matters not whether his constitutional right has
been invaded by a federal agent or by a state officer.
Elkins, 364 U.S. at 215 (footnote omitted).
52. Several states that adopted the exclusionary rule nevertheless admitted evidence
seized illegally by officers of another state. See People v. Touhy, 197 N.E. 849, 857 (111.
1935) (holding that although evidence unlawfully seized by state officers is not admissible,
the rule does not apply to evidence unlawfully obtained by others); Young v. Common-
wealth, 313 S.W.2d 580, 581 (Ky. 1958) (allowing evidence illegally seized by Missouri po-
lice officers to be admitted in a Kentucky court); People v. Winterheld, 102 N.W.2d 201,
203 (Mich. 1960) (holding that the court-created exclusionary rule is designed to effectu-
ate the guarantees of the state constitution, and such guarantees do not extend to acts
beyond its borders); State v. Olsen, 317 P.2d 938, 940 (Or. 1957) (finding that evidence
illegally obtained by officers of another state cannot be considered wrongful acts of the
state of Oregon); Kaufman v. State, 225 S.W.2d 75, 76 (Tenn. 1949) (concluding that the
exclusionary rule is a judicial pronouncement for the preservation of constitutional rights
of the citizens of Tennessee). Berman and Oberst noted these problems:
Of the states which have adopted the exclusionary rule by decision, five have con-
sidered the question of its application to evidence illegally obtained by the of-
ficers of a sister state and none have excluded it. Tennessee, Illinois, Kentucky,
Oregon, and, most recently, Michigan, have admitted the evidence. Oklahoma,
which excludes any evidence illegally obtained by an individual, might well ex-
clude evidence obtained by an officer in violation of this sister-state law, especially
since the search might also violate the federal constitution under Wolf. Some of
these states would also accept the reverse Silver Platter Doctrine. But even if a
state adopts the exclusionary rule and applies it to evidence procured by federal
officials, it might choose to draw the line at that point, accepting evidence pro-
cured without violation of any law of the admitting state. Reverse silver platter
and interstate silver platter are not quite analogous, either theoretically or practi-
cally. Federal officers may indeed be said to be state officers as well and the fed-
eral government may not be "foreign" in relation to the states, but this is hardly
true of the officers of a sister state with wholly different territorial jurisdiction.
Berman & Oberst, supra note 28, at 550 (footnotes omitted); see also Galler, supra note 28,
at 459 n.23.
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more practical level, it was troubling that a court in one jurisdiction
could enjoin its law enforcement officers from testifying in another
jurisdiction where that testimony was welcome.53
Mapp brought order out of chaos. It put an end to these irra-
tional results. Reason demanded that the exclusionary rule be ap-
plied in a consistent and logical fashion. If illegally seized evidence
was tainted and inadmissible, then it must be deemed tainted and
inadmissible in all courts, regardless of which government official
seized it. The exclusionary rule, if it was to exist, would have to be
applied in an absolute and consistent fashion throughout the country.
That certainty is what Mapp provided. For the first time since 1914,
federal and state jurisprudence were consistent.
In its decisions leading up to Mapp, as well as the language of the
Mapp opinion, the Court revealed its interest in reestablishing this
harmony. Only twelve years earlier, the Court had rejected an invita-
tion to reach the same conclusion.54 Between 1949 and 1961, how-
ever, it became clear that federal and state courts could not function
effectively under discordant and conflicting approaches to the exclu-
sionary rule. The Supreme Court recognized the need for consistency
in its 1960 decisions in Rios v. United States 5 and Elkins v. United
States.56 Perhaps through Rea v. United States,57 and later Wilson v.
Schnettler,58 the Court had foreseen the increasing demand for injunc-
tions that would cause a tangled web of insoluble problems involving
federal supremacy and state sovereignty.59 In any event, less than four
53. The Supreme Court addressed this problem in two decisions. In Rea v. United
States, 350 U.S. 214, 217 (1956), the Court upheld a district court injunction precluding a
federal agent from testifying about seized evidence in a state court after the district court
had determined that the evidence had been unlawfully seized. In Wilson v. Schnettler, 365
U.S. 381, 387-88 (1961), the Court ruled that, absent an allegation that evidence was ille-
gally seized or a federal court order or rule finding that a seizure was unlawful, federal
courts could not enjoin federal officers from testifying in state courts. The Mapp Court
specifically recognized the difficulties created by these situations. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 658;
see supra note 50.
It was also possible that states could attempt to enjoin their officers from testifying in
the courts of another state or even in federal courts. Cf Galler, supra note 28, at 459 n.23
(noting that a state's attempt to enjoin its officers from testifying in federal court would
violate the Supremacy Clause of the federal Constitution).
54. See Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 33 (1949) (holding that the Fourteenth Amend-
ment did not forbid the admission of evidence obtained by an unreasonable search and
seizure in a state court prosecution for a state crime).
55. 364 U.S. 253, 255 (1960); see supa note 41 and accompanying text.
56. 364 U.S. 206, 221 (1960); see supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
57. 350 U.S. 214 (1956).
58. 365 U.S. 381 (1961).
59. See supra notes 21-27 and accompanying text.
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months after the Wilson decision, the Court issued its opinion in
Mapp.6
0
It is clear from the language in Mapp that the Justices' desire to
return to a logical, consistent approach was a determinant in the
Court's decision:
There is no war between the Constitution and common
sense. Presently, a federal prosecutor may make no use of
evidence illegally seized, but a State's attorney across the
street may, although he supposedly is operating under the
enforceable prohibitions of the same Amendment ...
Moreover, as was said in Elkins, "It]he very essence of a
healthy federalism depends upon the avoidance of needless
conflict between state and federal courts." 6 1
The Justices also specifically noted their desire to eliminate the irra-
tional and unjust effects of disparate constitutional jurisprudence.62
In holding that Fourth Amendment protections applied to the
states through the Fourteenth Amendment, the Supreme Court rees-
tablished logic and consistency in federal and state exclusionary rule
jurisprudence. The Mapp decision also eliminated the practical
problems that had plagued the criminal justice system since Weeks.
This period of harmony, however, was only temporary.
III. THE EVOLUTION OF NEW FEDERALISM IN CONSTITUTIONAL
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
For several years following Mapp, federal and state criminal pro-
cedure jurisprudence continued to develop in a harmonious fash-
ion.6" The 1970s, however, brought a resurgence of disparate
treatment due primarily to the emergence of what has come to be
known as New Federalism.' New Federalism arose from the principle
60. The Supreme Court issued its decision in Wilson on February 27, 1961, Wilson, 365
U.S. at 381, and the Mapp decision on June 19, Mapp, 367 U.S. at 643. The language of
Mapp suggests that the Court's decision may have been based, at least in part, on the poten-
tial quagmire created by its holdings in Rea and Wilson. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 658. For rele-
vant text of opinion, see supra note 50.
61. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 657-58 (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 221
(1960)); see supra note 40. The Court's desire to return to a logical approach was presaged
by the Elkins decision the prior year. Elkins, 364 U.S. at 215; see supra note 51.
62. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 658; see supra note 50.
63. See Latzer, supra note 6, at 866; Melilli, supra note 6, at 669-70.
64. The advent of New Federalism is commonly ascribed to Justice Brennan's call for
such action in a 1977 law review article. Brennan, supra note 6, at 503-05; see, e.g., Gardner,
supra note 6, at 762. Although Justice Brennan's article undoubtedly had a great effect on
the development of New Federalism, the concept was discussed and advocated prior to
1977. See Wilkes, supra note 6 (published in 1974).
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that the guarantees of the United States Constitution provide only
minimum standards and the states are at liberty to accord their citi-
zens greater rights under their respective state constitutions. 65 For ex-
ample, states must require that affidavits for search warrants meet the
Gates "fair probability" test established under the United States Consti-
tution.' With regard to state prosecutions, however, state courts are
at liberty to interpret their state constitutions to require a stricter stan-
dard, such as the two-pronged, Aguilar-Spinelli test.6 7  In so doing,
65. As the Supreme Court of New Hampshire stated in State v. Ba//
When State constitutional issues have been raised, this court has a responsibility
to make an independent determination of the protections afforded under the
New Hampshire Constitution....
... While the role of the Federal Constitution is to provide the minimum level
of national protection of fundamental rights, our court has stated that it has the
power to interpret the New Hampshire Constitution as more protective of individ-
ual rights than the parallel provisions of the United States Constitution.
State v. Ball, 471 A.2d 347, 350 (N.H. 1983) (citations omitted); see also State v. Armstead,
262 S.E.2d 233, 234 (Ga. Ct. App. 1979) (holding that the United States Supreme Court's
decision that handwriting exemplars may be compelled without violating the Fifth Amend-
ment does not require the same result under Georgia's constitution); State v. Tanaka, 701
P.2d 1274, 1276 (Haw. 1985) (finding as unconstitutional the warrantless search of defend-
ant's garbage because the Hawaii Constitution recognizes an expectation of privacy beyond
the parallel provisions in the federal Bill of Rights); State v. Settle, 447 A.2d 1284, 1285
(N.H. 1982) (noting that the "[New Hampshire] constitution often will afford greater pro-
tection against the action of the State than does the Federal Constitution"); State v. Alston,
440 A.2d 1311, 1318-19 (N.J. 1981) (finding that "our State Constitution may indepen-
dently furnish a basis for protecting personal rights when it is not clear that the guarantees
of the federal Constitution would serve to grant that same level of protection" (citation
omitted)); Commonwealth v. Sell, 470 A.2d 457, 466 (Pa. 1983) (asserting that "[t]his
Court has not hesitated to interpret the Pennsylvania Constitution as affording greater
protection to defendants than the federal Constitution" (citation omitted)); Gardner,
supra note 6, at 762 n.4 (distinguishing judicial New Federalism from the legislative pro-
gram of the Reagan era); Melilli, supra note 6, at 670-71 (arguing that the federal Constitu-
tion provides a floor and that the states can supplement or expand federal constitutional
rights).
66. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983). Gates overruled the "two-pronged test"
of Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 114 (1964), and Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410,
413 (1969), and established a less stringent standard for demonstrating probable cause to
obtain a search warrant. Gates requires only that, based on the totality of circumstances,
the government establish a fair probability that contraband or evidence will be found at a
particular location. Gates, 462 U.S. at 238.
67. Aguilar, 378 U.S. at 114 (holding application for search warrant must inform the
magistrate of the underlying circumstances from which the informant concluded the nar-
cotics were where he claimed they were, and some of the underlying circumstances from
which the officer concluded the informant was credible or his information reliable);
Spinelli, 393 U.S. at 415 (holding that the magistrate must ask, "can it fairly be said that the
tip, even when certain parts of it have been corroborated by independent sources, is as
trustworthy as a tip which would pass Aguilais tests without independent corroboration?").
Some state courts have opted for the more stringent Aguilar-Spinelli test. See, e.g., State v.
Jones, 706 P.2d 317, 324 (Alaska 1985) (holding that the broader guarantees against un-
reasonable searches and seizures afforded under Alaska's constitution would not be pro-
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these states apply a standard that holds law enforcement to more strin-
gent guidelines, while giving individuals greater liberties than under
the federal test. Although the relative merits of the policies of New
Federalism have been and will continue to be hotly debated,68 it does
have the undeniable effect of developing differences between federal
and state constitutional jurisprudence69 as well as differences among
the judicial decisions of the various states."0
The adoption of New Federalism by individual states can be at-
tributed to many factors. These include the following: a perception
by state courts that the United States Supreme Court has in recent
years become more conservative and retreated from its more liberal
policies of the past,"1 the urging of scholars and judicial officials,72 a
tected by the Gates test); Commonwealth v. Melendez, 551 N.E.2d 514, 515, 518 (Mass.
1990) (reaffirming the Aguilar-Spineli test as appropriate for determining probable cause
under the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights); People v. Griminger, 524 N.E.2d 409, 411
(N.Y. 1988) (holding that "the Aguilar-Spinelli two-prong test should be applied in deter-
mining whether there is a sufficient factual predicate upon which to issue a search war-
rant"); State v. Jackson, 688 P.2d 136, 139-41 (Wash. 1984) (en banc) (describing the
Supreme Court's Gates standard as "nebulous," unpersuasive, and inapplicable in the con-
text of state constitutional analysis).
68. See supra note 6.
69. See infra notes 77-104 and accompanying text.
70. See, e.g., infra notes 82, 87; see also Fisch, supra note 6, at 519 (noting that states are
adopting different constitutional approaches to issues involving electronic surveillance);
Melilli, supra note 6, at 676-77, 679-80 (noting that states can take different approaches to
the same issue); The Intepretation of State Constitutional Rights, supra note 6, at 1376 (noting
that states may adopt different constitutional standards among themselves that also differ
from the federal standard).
71. The importance of this factor was noted in a concurring opinion of the Supreme
Court of Oregon:
Almost a decade ago Professor Donald E. Wilkes, Jr., wrote some prophetic
words in his article entitled Federalism in Criminal Procedure: State Court Evasion of
the Burger Court, 62 Ky. L.J. 421 (1974). After commenting that the United States
Supreme Court has transformed from a tribunal of unprecedented legal daring
to one of modest aims and self-limiting accomplishments, he predicted that
"[sltate courts may be on the verge of gaining new importance, if, in anticipation
of the Supreme Court's retrenchment, state constitutions become a more impor-
tant source of limits on state power." He continued:
"... In fact, state constitutions may provide the only outlet forjudges ... who
disagree with the more deferential approach the Supreme Court may take toward
legislation and other state action." Id. at 421.
He continued:
"The [United States Supreme] Court's shift in attitude has made conditions
ripe for an astonishing development in criminal procedure-evasion of the
Supreme Court by state courts willing to protect rights of criminal defendants
that are no longer guaranteed under the Federal Constitution as interpreted by
the [United States Supreme] Court." Id. at 425.
This prophecy came to pass recently when the United States Supreme Court
decided Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
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desire to assert the judicial independence of the state courts, 73 the
textual and historical differences among state constitutions, 7  and in-
vitations extended by the United States Supreme Court itself.
75
State v. Lowry, 667 P.2d 996, 1003-04 (Or. 1983) (en banc) (Jones,J, specially concurring)
(quoting Wilkes, supra note 6, at 421, 425) (alterations in original) (footnote and citations
omitted). See also Brennan, supra note 6, at 495, 498-501; Fisch, supra note 6, at 510; Gard-
ner, supra note 6, at 771; False Prophet, supra note 6, at 432; Melilli, supra note 6, at 673-74;
Morrison, supra note 6, at 595-96; Wilkes, supra note 6, at 421, 423, 433-34; Donald E.
Ziegler, Constitutional Rights of the Accused-Developing Dichotomy Between Federal and State
Law, 48 PA. BAR ASS'N Q. 241, 247-49 (1977); The Interpreation of State Constitutional Rights,
supra note 6, at 1331, 1368-69.
72. See, e.g., Brennan, supra note 6, at 502; Wilkes, supra note 6, at 425, 434-35.
73. In Baker v. City of Fairbanks, 471 P.2d 386 (Alaska 1970), the Supreme Court of
Alaska stated:
While we must enforce the minimum constitutional standards imposed upon us
by the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, we are free, and we are under a duty, to develop additional constitutional
rights and privileges under our Alaska Constitution if we find such fundamental
rights and privileges to be within the intention and spirit of our local constitu-
tional language and to be necessary for the kind of civilized life and ordered
liberty which is at the core of our constitutional heritage. We need not stand by
idly and passively, waiting for constitutional direction from the highest court in
the land. Instead we should be moving concurrently to develop and expound the
principles embedded in our constitutional law.
Id. at 401-02 (footnotes omitted); see also supra note 65.
74. Brennan, supra note 6, at 501; Collins, supra note 6, at 1120, 1137-38 (discussing
whether textual similarities should control); Galie, supra note 6, at 761-72 (discussing the
effects of textual and historical differences among the various states); The Interpretation of
State Constitutional Rights, supra note 6, at 1348, 1385-87 (discussing of effects of textual
differences). State constitutions can differ dramatically. See Gardner, supra note 6, at 819
(noting the differences among state constitutions). Whether and under what circum-
stances state courts should adopt the approach of New Federalism has been a topic of lively
debate. See Galie, supra note 6, at 761-72, 779-85; Maltz, False Prophet, supra note 6, at 435-
43; Maltz, The Dark Side, supra note 6, at 1002-23.
75. As early as 1940, the United States Supreme Court noted:
It is fundamental that state courts be left free and unfettered by us in interpreting
their state constitutions. But it is equally important that ambiguous or obscure
adjudications by state courts do not stand as barriers to a determination by this
Court of the validity under the federal constitution of state action. Intelligent
exercise of our appellate powers compels us to ask for the elimination of the
obscurities and ambiguities from opinions in such cases.... For no other course
assures that important federal issues, such as have been argued here, will reach
this Court for adjudication; that state courts will not be the final arbiters of impor-
tant issues under the federal constitution; and that we will not encroach on the
constitutional jurisdiction of the states. This is not a mere technical rule nor a
rule for our convenience. It touches the division of authority between state courts
and this Court and is of equal importance to each. Only by such explicitness can
the highest courts of the states and this Court keep within the bounds of their
respective jurisdictions.
Minnesota v. National Tea Co., 309 U.S. 551, 557 (1940).
In Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477 (1972), the Court stated:
Thus, the prosecution must prove at least by a preponderance of the evidence
that the confession was voluntary. Of course, the States are free, pursuant to their
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Whatever the reasons, New Federalism is thriving, particularly in the
judicial determinations of certain states. 76
What began slowly has developed into a tidal wave of state court
opinions that diverge from the standards established under the fed-
eral Constitution. Distinctions have arisen in a variety of situations
under the Fourth Amendment. These distinctions include the follow-
ing: the appropriate standard for probable cause determinations in
search warrant situations,77 recognition of the good faith exception to
the exclusionary rule, 78 the requirement of a warrant for automobile
own law, to adopt a higher standard. They may indeed differ as to the appropri-
ate resolution of the values they find at stake.
Id. at 489. Similarly, in Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1985), the Court held: "If the
state court decision indicates clearly and expressly that it is alternatively based on bona fide
separate, adequate, and independent grounds, we, of course, will not undertake to review
the decision." Id. at 1041. More recently, the Court specifically noted the right of the
states to interpret their constitutions more stringently than the federal Constitution: "Indi-
vidual States may surely construe their own constitutions as imposing more stringent con-
straints on police conduct than does the Federal Constitution." California v. Greenwood,
486 U.S. 35, 43 (1988); see also Arizona v. Evans, 115 S. Ct. 1185, 1190 (1995); Cooper v.
California, 386 U.S. 58, 62 (1967).
76. Most states have interpreted their state constitutional rights to mirror those guaran-
teed under the federal Constitution. See Gardner, supra note 6, at 788-93, 804 (noting that,
in many cases, state courts interpret the state constitution to provide the same rights as the
federal Constitution); Wilkes, supra note 6, at 436 (citing state cases that have not used the
adequate state ground rule to avoid Supreme Court review); The Interpretation of State Consti-
tutional Rights, supra note 6, at 1368, 1388 (citing state cases that interpret state constitu-
tional criminal protections as equivalent to the analogous federal rights). Increasingly
more states are adopting the approach of New Federalism. The courts of certain states,
such as Alaska, Colorado, Hawaii, Massachusetts, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania, are more
disposed than others to reach conclusions under their constitutions that differ from the
United States Supreme Court's decisions under the federal Constitution. See infra notes 77-
104 and accompanying text; see also Fisch, supra note 6, at 511-17 (noting that NewJersey
has been a leader in the adoption of New Federalism); Sosnov, supra note 6, at 245-340
(reviewing the differences between federal and Pennsylvania cases); Schneider, supra note
42, at 225-29 (discussing Colorado's adoption of New Federalism).
77. See supra notes 66-67.
78. Compare United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922-23 (1984) (recognizing a good
faith exception to the exclusionary rule under the federal Constitution) with State v.
Novembrino, 519 A.2d 820, 856-57 (N.J. 1987) (holding that there is no good faith excep-
tion to the exclusionary rule under the New Jersey Constitution) and People v. Bigelow,
488 N.E.2d 451, 458 (N.Y. 1985) (holding that there is no good faith exception to the
exclusionary rule under the New York Constitution) and Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 586
A.2d 887, 901 (Pa. 1991) (holding that there is no good faith exception under the Penn-
sylvania Constitution). Several states have determined that the good faith exception does
not apply because of a statutory exclusionary rule. See State v. Garcia, 547 So. 2d 628, 630
(Fla. 1989) (finding that the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule does not apply
to the exclusionary provisions of the Florida wiretap law); Gary v. State, 422 S.E.2d 426, 430
(Ga. 1992) (holding that the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule does not apply
in Georgia because of a legislatively mandated exclusionary rule); Commonwealth v.
Upton, 476 N.E.2d 548, 551 (Mass. 1985) (stating that a state statutory exclusionary rule
requires that evidence be excluded absent a showing of probable cause); State v. Carter,
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searches,79 consent searches," ° the plain view doctrine,8 t standing re-
quirements, inventory searches,8 3 consensual monitoring of conver-
sations,"' the use of dogs to detect narcotics, 5 the standard for
370 S.E.2d 553, 562 (N.C. 1988) (stating that the job of crafting a good faith exception to
North Carolina's exclusionary rule belongs to the legislature, not the judiciary); see also
Schneider, supra note 42, at 231 (discussing jurisdictions that have rejected the good faith
exception).
79. Compare United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 809 (1982) (eliminating the warrant
requirement for vehicle searches under the federal Constitution) with State v. Benoit, 417
A.2d 895, 901 (R.I. 1980) (holding that, absent exigent circumstances, a warrant is re-
quired for a vehicle search under the Rhode Island Constitution).
80. Compare Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227 (1973) (holding that an
individual's knowledge of the right to refuse is not required to find consent to search
under the federal Constitution) with State v.Johnson, 346 A.2d 66, 67-68 (N.J. 1975) (hold-
ing that, under the New Jersey Constitution, the government must prove the individual's
knowledge of the right to refuse in order to establish valid consent).
81. Compare Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 739-43 (1983) (holding that, under the fed-
eral Constitution, the plain view doctrine permits a warrantless seizure of a suspicious
item) with State v. Ball, 471 A.2d 347, 353 (N.H. 1983) (holding that, under the New
Hampshire Constitution, mere suspicion is not enough to justify the warrantless seizure of
an item).
82. Compare Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133-34, 140-48 (1978) (rejecting the auto-
matic standing rule and holding that in order to establish standing to exclude evidence.
under the federal Constitution, the individual must establish a legitimate expectation of
privacy in the invaded place) with State v. Culotta, 343 So. 2d 977, 981-82 (La. 1976) (hold-
ing that, under the Louisiana Constitution, standing is given to third parties who are ad-
versely affected by the improper search) and Commonwealth v. Amendola, 550 N.E.2d 121,
125-26 (Mass. 1990) (holding that, under the Massachusetts Constitution, anyone charged
with possession of an item automatically has standing to object to its admissibility) and
State v. Settle, 447 A.2d 1284, 1285-86 (N.H. 1982) (holding that the automatic standing
rule applies under the New Hampshire Constitution) and State v. Alston, 440 A.2d 1311,
1320 (N.J. 1981) (holding the automatic standing rule applies under the NewJersey Con-
stitution) and Commonwealth v. Sell, 470 A.2d 457, 468 (Pa. 1983) (holding that the auto-
matic standing rule applies under the Pennsylvania Constitution) and State v. Wood, 536
A.2d 902, 908 (Vt. 1987) (holding that the automatic standing rule applies under the Ver-
mont Constitution) and State v. Simpson, 622 P.2d 1199, 1206 (Wash. 1980) (en banc)
(holding that the automatic standing rule applies under the Washington Constitution).
83. Compare Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 374-75 (1987) (holding that, under the
federal Constitution, inventory searches of impounded vehicles and their contents, includ-
ing containers, are lawful) with State v. Daniel, 589 P.2d 408, 417-18 (Alaska 1979) (hold-
ing that "a warrantless inventory search of closed, locked, or sealed luggage, containers, or
packages contained within a vehicle is unreasonable and thus an unconstitutional search
under the Alaska Constitution") and State v. Opperman, 247 N.W.2d 673, 675 (S.D. 1976)
(holding that, under the South Dakota Constitution, inventory searches of vehicles are
limited to articles within plain view).
84. Compare United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 752-53 (1971) (holding that, under
the federal Constitution, agents may monitor a conversation with the consent of only one
of the participants) with Commonwealth v. Blood, 507 N.E.2d 1029, 1034 (Mass. 1987)
(holding unconstitutional, under the Massachusetts Constitution, a statute that authorized
consensual monitoring in a person's home) and Commonwealth v. Schaeffer, 536 A.2d
354, 371 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987) (holding that consensual monitoring of a person's conversa-
tions within his home without his consent violates the Pennsylvania Constitution).
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determining when the seizure of a person takes place, 86 searches inci-
dent to arrest,8 7 the use of automobile checkpoints,88 limitations on
the use of beepers,89 monitoring the movements of an arrested per-
85. Compare United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983) (holding that, under the
federal Constitution, a "canine sniff" does not constitute a search within the meaning of
the Fourth Amendment) with People v. Dunn, 564 N.E.2d 1054, 1057-58 (N.Y. 1990) (hold-
ing that, under the New York Constitution, a "canine sniff" is a search), cert. denied, 501 U.S.
1219 (1991) and Commonwealth v. Martin, 626 A.2d 556, 560-61 (Pa. 1993) (holding that,
under the Pennsylvania Constitution, a "canine sniff" of a person is a search).
86. Compare California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 626-27 (1991) (holding that, under
the federal Constitution, a seizure occurs only where there is an application of physical
force or submission to the assertion of authority) with State v. Oquendo, 613 A.2d 1300,
1310 (Conn. 1992) (holding that, under the Connecticut Constitution, a seizure takes
place when a reasonable person would not feel free to leave) and State v. Quino, 840 P.2d
358, 364 (Haw. 1992) (holding that, under the Hawaii Constitution, a seizure takes place
when a reasonable person would not feel free to leave), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1849 (1993)
and State v. Doss, 603 A.2d 102 (NJ. Super. CL App. Div. 1992) (holding that, under New
Jersey state law, pursuit is a seizure), cert. denied, 611 A.2d 655 (N.J. 1992) and State v.
Holmes, 813 P.2d 28, 34 (Or. 1991) (holding that, under the Oregon Constitution, a per-
son is seized when he or she has an objectively reasonable belief that he or she is not free
to leave).
87. Compare United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 234-35 (1973) (holding that,
under the federal Constitution, a search of an individual incident to any custodial arrest is
lawful) with Zehrung v. State, 569 P.2d 189, 199 (Alaska 1977) (holding that, under the
Alaska Constitution, searches incident to custodial arrests are limited to the "degree neces-
sary under the particular circumstances"), modified on reh'g, 573 P.2d 858 (Alaska 1978) and
State v. Kaluna, 520 P.2d 51, 60 (Haw. 1974) (holding that, under the Hawaii Constitution,
"a valid custodial arrest does not give rise to a unique right to search; instead, the circum-
stances surrounding the arrest generate the authority to search without a warrant") and
People v. Gokey, 457 N.E.2d 723, 724-25 (N.Y. 1983) (holding that, under the New York
Constitution, a warrantless search incident to arrest is unreasonable in the absence of exi-
gent circumstances) and State v. Hehman, 578 P.2d 527, 529 (Wash. 1978) (en banc)
(holding that, under the Washington Constitution, a custodial arrest is not proper for a
minor traffic violation and, therefore, the search of such a person is improper). With
regard to the search of a vehicle incident to arrest, compare New York v. Belton, 453 U.S.
454, 460-61 (1981) (holding that, under the federal Constitution, an officer may search the
passenger compartment, including the glove box and other containers, incident to the
custodial arrest of an occupant of an automobile) with State v. Stroud, 720 P.2d 436, 440-41
(Wash. 1986) (en banc) (holding that, under the Washington Constitution, determination
of the reasonableness of the search of a vehicle incident to the arrest of an occupant is
based on balancing the dangers to the officers and the possible destruction of evidence
against the privacy interests of the individual) and State v. Pierce, 642 A.2d 947, 959 (N.J.
1994) (holding that, under the NewJersey Constitution, the rule in Belton does not apply
to warrantless arrests for motor vehicle offenses).
88. Compare Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 448-55 (1990) (hold-
ing that, under the federal Constitution, automobile checkpoints to detect drunken drivers
are permitted) with Sitz v. Department of State Police, 506 N.W.2d 209, 218 (Mich. 1993)
(holding that automobile checkpoints to detect drunken drivers violate the Michigan Con-
stitution) and State v. Koppel, 499 A.2d 977, 982-83 (N.H. 1985) (holding that automobile
checkpoints to detect drunken drivers violate the New Hampshire Constitution).
89. Compare United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 719-21 (1984) (holding that, under the
federal Constitution, law enforcement officers need not obtain a warrant to use a beeper in
public view) with People v. Oates, 698 P.2d 811, 818 (Colo. 1985) (holding that, under the
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son,90 searches of refuse, 91 and limitations on the use of pen
registers.92
Disparities have developed in Fifth and Sixth Amendment con-
texts as well, including the use of suppressed confessions for impeach-
ment purposes,93 the standard for the determination of the
voluntariness of confessions,94 the scope of the right against self-in-
Colorado Constitution, officers must as a practical matter obtain a warrant prior to the
installation of a beeper).
90. Compare Washington v. Chrisman, 455 U.S. 1, 7 (1982) (holding that "it is not 'un-
reasonable' under the Fourth Amendment for a police officer, as a matter of routine, to
monitor the movements of an arrested person") with State v. Chrisman, 676 P.2d 419, 423-
24 (Wash. 1984) (holding that, under the Washington Constitution, an officer may follow
an arrested person into a private dwelling only if the officer has specific, articulable facts to
justify entry).
91. Compare California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 39-44 (1988) (holding that warrant-
less searches of an individual's garbage outside of the curtilage are not prohibited under
the federal Constitution) with State v. Tanaka, 701 P.2d 1274, 1276-77 (Haw. 1985) (hold-
ing that warrantiess searches of garbage outside of the curtilage are protected under the
Hawaii Constitution) and State v. Hempele, 576 A.2d 793, 814 (NJ. 1990) (holding that
warrantless searches of garbage left on the curb for collection violate the New Jersey
Constitution).
92. Compare Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 739-46 (1979) (holding that the installa-
tion of a pen register does not constitute a "search" under the federal Constitution) with
People v. Sporleder, 666 P.2d 135, 140-41 (Colo. 1983) (en banc) (holding that, under the
Colorado Constitution, the use of a pen register constitutes a search and seizure) and Com-
monwealth v. Beauford, 475 A.2d 783, 791 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984) (holding that, under the
Pennsylvania Constitution, a person has a constitutionally protected expectation of privacy
in the telephone numbers that person calls), appeal dismissed as improvidently granted, 496
A.2d 1143 (Pa. 1985) and State v. Gunwall, 720 P.2d 808, 816 (Wash. 1986) (en banc)
(holding that, under the Washington Constitution, the installation of a pen register consti-
tutes a search). See also State v. Hunt, 450 A.2d 952, 955-58 (N.J. 1982) (holding that,
under the New Jersey Constitution, an individual has a protectible interest in telephone
toll billing records).
93. Compare Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 225-26 (1971) (holding that, under the
federal Constitution, voluntary statements obtained in violation of Miranda may be used to
impeach a defendant on cross-examination) with People v. Disbrow, 545 P.2d 272, 280
(Cal. 1976) (en banc) (holding that, under the California Constitution, voluntary state-
ments obtained in violation of Miranda may not be used for impeachment purposes) and
State v. Santiago, 492 P.2d 657, 664-65 (Haw. 1971) (holding that, under the Hawaii Con-
stitution, voluntary statements obtained in violation of Miranda may not be used for im-
peachment purposes).
94. Compare Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 489 (1972) (holding that, under the federal
Constitution, the government must establish the voluntariness of a confession by a prepon-
derance of the evidence) with People v. Jimenez, 580 P.2d 672, 679 (Cal. 1978) (holding
that, under the California Constitution, the government must establish the voluntariness of
a confession beyond a reasonable doubt) and Magley v. State, 335 N.E.2d 811, 817 (Ind.
1975) (reaffirming that, under the Indiana Constitution, the government must establish
the voluntariness of a confession beyond a reasonable doubt) and State v. Vernon, 385 So.
2d 200, 204 (La. 1980) (holding that, under the Louisiana Constitution, the government
must establish the voluntariness of a confession beyond a reasonable doubt) and State v.
Miller, 388 A.2d 218, 224 (N.J. 1978) (holding that, under the NewJersey Constitution, the
government must establish the voluntariness of a confession beyond a reasonable doubt)
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crimination,95 the validity of derivative use immunity,96 the require-
ment that the accused be notified of attempted contacts by counsel,97
renewal of questioning after assertion of Miranda rights,9" double
jeopardy,99 the right to "face-to-face" confrontation,100 the standard
and People v. Danziger, 364 N.E.2d .1125, 1126-27 (N.Y. 1977) (reaffirming that, under the
Constitution of New York, the government must establish the voluntariness of a confession
beyond a reasonable doubt).
95. Compare Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 266-67 (1967) (holding that the defend-
ant's right against self-incrimination, under the federal Constitution, does not prevent the
taking of handwriting exemplars) with State v. Arrmstead, 262 S.E.2d 233, 234 (Ga. Ct. App.
1979) (holding that compelling a defendant to provide handwriting exemplars would vio-
late his right against self-incrimination under the Georgia Constitution).
.96. Compare Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 462 (1972) (holding that derivative
use immunity is valid under the federal Constitution) with State v. Gonzalez, 853 P.2d 526,
530 (Alaska 1993) (holding that derivative use immunity is impermissible under the Alaska
Constitution) and State v. Miyasaki, 614 P.2d 915, 921-23 (Haw. 1980) (holding that deriva-
tive use immunity is invalid under the Hawaii Constitution) and Attorney Gen. v. Colleton,
444 N.E.2d 915, 918-21 (Mass. 1982) (holding that derivative use immunity offends the
Massachusetts Constitution) and State v. Soriano, 684 P.2d 1220, 1232 (Or. Ct. App.)
(holding that derivative use immunity is invalid under the Oregon Constitution), affd, 693
P.2d 26 (Or. 1984).
97. Compare Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 422-23 (1986) (holding that, under the
federal Constitution, a detainee need not be apprised of efforts by counsel to render assist-
ance if the detainee does not request an attorney) with State v. Stoddard, 537 A.2d 446, 452
(Conn. 1988) (holding that, under the Connecticut Constitution, a detainee must be in-
formed of efforts by counsel to render assistance) and Haliburton v. State, 514 So. 2d 1088,
1090 (Fla. 1987) (holding that police refusal to grant counsel access to a detainee violated
the Florida Constitution), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1259 (1991) and People v. Pinzon, 377
N.E.2d 721, 725 (N.Y. 1978) (holding that, under the New York Constitution, police have
the burden of ensuring that counsel can communicate with a detainee) and State v.
Haynes, 602 P.2d 272, 277 (Or. 1979) (en banc) (holding that, under the Oregon Consti-
tution, if counsel attempts to contact a detainee and the police do not inform the detainee,
no statements thereafter given by the detainee are admissible), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 945
(1980) and Commonwealth v. Hilliard, 370 A.2d 322, 324 (Pa. 1977) (holding that, under
the Pennsylvania Constitution, if counsel has expressed a desire to be present during inter-
rogation, a waiver of counsel obtained in counsel's absence is invalid).
98. Compare Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 99-107 (1975) (holding that, under the
federal Constitution, a suspect who has asserted the right to remain silent may be
reinterviewed at a later time) with People v. Pettingill, 578 P.2d 108, 117 (Cal. 1978) (en
banc) (holding that, under the California Constitution, a suspect may not be reinterviewed
after asserting his right to remain silent).
99. Compare Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 127-39 (1959) (holding that, under the
federal Constitution, successive state and federal prosecutions do not violate the Double
Jeopardy Clause) with People v. Cooper, 247 N.W.2d 866, 870 (Mich. 1976) (holding that,
under the Michigan Constitution, a second prosecution will be permitted only if the inter-
ests of the State of Michigan and the jurisdiction that initially prosecuted are substantially
different) and State v. Hogg, 385 A.2d 844, 847 (N.H. 1978) (holding that successive prose-
cutions in federal and state court are barred under the New Hampshire Constitution) and
Commonwealth v. Mills, 286 A.2d 638, 642 (Pa. 1971) (holding that a second prosecution
and imposition of punishment for the same offense violates the Pennsylvania Constitution
unless the interests of Pennsylvania and the jurisdiction that initially prosecuted are sub-
stantially different).
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for the application of the right to trial by jury, 01 the requirement that
counsel be present at a lineup held before the accused is formally
charged,"° ' and the general standard for the attachment of the right
to counsel.10 3 Although this is not intended to constitute a compre-
hensive list of all of the differences that have developed or all of the
states that have reached these conclusions, it provides some indication
of the magnitude of these changes.1
0 4
Because each state is free to make an independent determination
on each of these issues, plus a wide variety of other issues,10 5 an almost
limitless number of divergent governing principles can develop and,
in fact, are developing in the area of criminal procedure. Many of the
effects of this splintering of the jurisprudence remain unrealized, but
much can be learned by reflecting upon the period before Mapp re-
turned uniformity to the jurisprudence of criminal procedure.
100. Compare Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 844-50 (1990) (holding that the federal
Constitution does not require "face-to-face" confrontation) with People v. Fitzpatrick, 633
N.E.2d 685, 688-89 (Ill. 1994) (holding that the Illinois Constitution requires "face-to-face"
confrontation) and Commonwealth v. Ludwig, 594 A.2d 281, 282-85 (Pa. 1991) (holding
that "face-to-face" confrontation is required under the Pennsylvania Constitution).
101. Compare Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 68-74 (1970) (holding that, under the
federal Constitution, a defendant has a right to jury trial only where imprisonment of more
than six months is authorized) with Baker v. City of Fairbanks, 471 P.2d 386, 401 (Alaska
1970) (holding that, under the Alaska Constitution, a defendant is entitled to ajury trial in
any criminal prosecution for violation of state law or city ordinance).
102. Compare Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 687-91 (1972) (holding that, under the fed-
eral Constitution, an accused does not have a right to counsel at a lineup held before
being formally charged) with Blue v. State, 558 P.2d 636, 643 (Alaska 1977) (holding that,
under the Alaska Constitution, absent exigent circumstances, counsel should be provided
for lineups held before the accused is formally charged) and People v. Bustamante, 634
P.2d 927, 935-36 (Cal. 1981) (en banc) (holding that an accused has a right to counsel at a
preindictment lineup under the California Constitution).
103. Compare Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 368-74 (1979) (holding that, under the fed-
eral Constitution, the right to counsel attaches only in cases in which the defendant is
actually sentenced to a term of imprisonment) with Alexander v. City of Anchorage, 490
P.2d 910, 915 (Alaska 1971) (holding that, under the Alaska Constitution, a defendant is
entitled to the assistance of counsel "for any offense a direct penalty for which may be
incarceration ... loss of a valuable license, or which may result in heavy enough fine to
indicate criminality").
104. For other extensive reviews of the cases in which states have departed from federal
constitutional interpretations, see Melilli, supra note 6, at 675-85, and The Interpretation of
State Constitutional Rights, supra note 6, at 1370-84. See also Sosnov, supra note 6, at 237-340
(reviewing the cases in which Pennsylvania courts have departed from the federal interpre-
tation of constitutional rights).
105. See, e.g., supra note 70.
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IV. THE EFFECTS OF NEW FEDERALISM ON THE LAW OF CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE'
The arrival of New Federalism has provoked a great deal of com-
ment, much of it directed to philosophical issues. 10 6 To some extent,
commentators' positions may be affected by whether they favor a lib-
eral or conservative approach to constitutional criminal procedure.
Many who favor a more liberal approach may, as a matter of policy,
prefer that the states be left to freely expand individual rights under
the state constitutions, while many of a more conservative view may
advocate consistency between state and federal constitutional doc-
trine.' °7 Determination of the relative merits of these philosophical
positions will be left to others.
Certain undeniable effects of New Federalism, however, may in-
fluence a decision on its merits. Many of these same situations existed
during the time period between the Court's decisions in Weeks and
Mapp and inspired critical comment by scholars of the day.' This
section discusses these effects and examines relevant observations of
both courts and commentators during the period before Mapp. Per-
haps through this inquiry the lessons learned prior to Mapp can be of
benefit and the mistakes of the past can be avoided.
A. The Fragmentation of Criminal Procedure Jurisprudence
New Federalism has led to the fragmentation of constitutional
criminal procedure jurisprudence.' °9 On a multitude of issues, the
federal courts and the courts of each of the fifty states are reaching
different conclusions based on different constitutions. The magni-
tude of these changes can be appreciated only when one further con-
siders that each state is at liberty to reach its own conclusion on each
issue, that the nature and basis of each of those decisions can vary
among each state, and that those conclusions can then differ from the
federal approach. This leads to an almost limitless number of varia-
tions and permutations. In a few short years the unified national sys-
tem of constitutional criminal procedure has been transformed into a
perplexing melange of disparate constitutional principles.
In many ways, the present situation is similar to that which existed
immediately prior to Mapp. At that time as well, federal constitutional
106. See supra note 6.
107. See, e.g., Latzer, supra note 6, at 863-65 (discussing the competing viewpoints of
various critics of New Federalism).
108. See supra notes 28, 31-36.
109. See supra notes 77-105 and accompanying text.
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principles differed from those of the states, and the states differed
among themselves.'1 ° Scholars of the time noted that it would be sal-
utary for the term "legality," in the constitutional sense, to have the
same meaning throughout the country."' Logic and perplexing
problems, including the silver platter doctrine and injunctions issued
against law enforcement officers, ultimately led the Court to conclude
that "healthy federalism" required a unified jurisprudence in the area
of constitutional criminal procedure."'
On an intuitive and theoretical level, maintaining consistency in
court decisions on constitutional issues is appealing.' 1 Where the
language employed in the federal and state constitutions is the same,
it might be expected that the same words would have the same mean-
ing." 4 As noted by the pre-Mapp scholars, even when specific terms
differ, all citizens should be governed by the same constitutional prin-
ciples. 1 5 The result is troublesome when an accused in state court is
freed as a result of the suppression of evidence, while across the street
in federal court another defendant is convicted and sentenced on the
same facts. 1 6 It is equally disturbing that the issue of whether a crimi-
nal defendant will receive double jeopardy protection depends upon
the prosecutors' choice of the forum." 7
This fragmentation has led to an arcane labyrinth of constitu-
tional principles that are not easily understood by law enforcement
110. See supra notes 11-42 and accompanying text.
111. Kamisar, supra note 28, at 1163 n.268 (citing Galler, supra note 28, at 458).
112. See supra notes 40, 61 and accompanying text.
113. The court in State v. Bolt, 689 P.2d 519, 527-28 (Ariz. 1984) stated: "We believe...
that one of the few things worse than a single exclusionary rule is two different exclusion-
ary rules.... It is poor judicial policy for rules governing the suppression of evidence to
differ depending upon whether the defendant is arrested by federal or state officers." See
also Fisch, supra note 6, at 516-19 (espousing the need for uniformity); Melilli, supra note 6,
at 736 (arguing for uniformity). But see The Interpretation of State Constitutional Rights, supra
note 6, at 1395 (stating that "interests of federal-state uniformity... are simply one consid-
eration to be balanced against the other considerations that argue for a divergent state
rule").
114. Whether the exact same language should be given the same meaning is a matter of
intense debate. Compare Maltz, The Dark Side, supra note 6, at 995-96, 1002-05, 1023 (favor-
ing same meaning approach) with Collins, supra note 6, at 1137 (arguing that textual simi-
larities should not control) and The Interpretation of State Constitutional Rights, supra note 6,
at 1348 (stating that "even when confronted with identical federal and state constitutional
language, a state court has a different, more expansive role to play in applying its version of
the provision") and Brennan, supra note 6, at 500-02 (arguing that the history of state court
decisions that have declined to follow opinions of the United States Supreme Court is
indicative of the understanding that state constitutional provisions were not adopted to
mirror the federal Constitution).
115. See supra notes 111, 113.
116. See infra notes 124-130 and accompanying text.
117. See infra notes 194-195 and accompanying text.
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agents or members of the bar.' It has led to uncertainty on many
issues.' 1 9 Even if the United States Supreme Court makes a ruling,
the issue will not be settled until it has been decided by the highest
court in each of the fifty states.' 2 0 On a more practical level, it has led
to severe problems involving silver platters, joint investigations, and
choice of laws.
12
'
B. Silver Platters
In the years prior to Mapp, commentators decried the illogical
and patently unjust results of silver platter situations that arose from
disparate state and federal constitutional principles.' 22 They were ap-
palled that state officers testifying in federal court could introduce
evidence barred by the federal exclusionary rule, that federal agents
could introduce illegally seized evidence in state court, and that state
officials could introduce illegally seized evidence in the courts of an-
other state.' 2  Calls were made for the elimination of silver platters by
the reunification of constitutional jurisprudence,' 24 and the Supreme
Court responded. The Justices specifically stated that the elimination
118. As Judge Ziegler noted:
Although the foregoing rules [relating to New Federalism] may be obvious,
their application has created confusion among counsel and some courts. During
oral argument of Michigan v. Mosley,... before the United States Supreme Court,
the following dialogue occurred between counsel for Mosley and one member of
the Court:
COURT: Why can't you argue all of this as being contrary to the law and the
Constitution of the State of Michigan?
COUNSEL: I can because we have the same provision in the Michigan Con-
stitution of 1963 as we have in the Fifth Amendment of the Federal Constitution,
certainly.
COURT: Well, you argued the whole thing before.
COUNSEL: In the Court of Appeals.
COURT: Yes.
COUNSEL: I really did not touch upon-I predicated my entire argument
on the Federal Constitution, I must admit that I did not mention the equivalent
provision of the Michigan Constitution of 1963, although I could have. And I
may assure this Court that at every opportunity in the future, I will.
(LAUGHTER).
Ziegler, supra note 71, at 242-43.
119. See Fernandez, supra note 6, at 510-11 (noting the "arbitrariness and ambiguities"
generated by the approach of the New Jersey Supreme Court).
120. See Latzer, supra note 6, at 865 (stating that "[w]ith the revival of state constitu-
tional law, no one can know whether a law or a procedure is valid in the individual state-
even after the highest court in the nation has ruled on the matter-until the state courts
have also considered the question").
121. See infra notes 126-160 and accompanying text.
122. See supra notes 28-40 and accompanying text.
123. See supra notes 31-36.
124. See supra notes 28-37 and accompanying text.
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of these unjust practices was one of the primary reasons for their opin-
ion in Mapp.
1 25
The rise of New Federalism has brought about the return of the
silver platter doctrine. In the innumerable cases involving overlap-
ping federal and state jurisdiction, state officers can avoid more strin-
gent provisions of state constitutions merely by taking the case to
federal court.1 26 Because a large number of issues receive disparate
treatment, these opportunities arise with great frequency, and as one
judicial official has noted, state officers are increasingly taking advan-
tage of these occurrences. 127 In most interstate situations, the officers
may select the state where charges will be filed, and they are at liberty
to choose the jurisdiction that has the most favorable constitutional
principles. 128 In joint federal-state investigations, it may be possible
to ensure the admissibility of evidence merely by designating only fed-
eral agents as evidence collection officers." In a variety of contexts,
New Federalism has resurrected the baneful silver platter doctrine
and given it new life. l13
125. See supra notes 50, 61 and accompanying text.
126. Galie, supra note 6, at 737-38 (noting the disparate federal and state constitutional
provisions in Alaska); Ziegler, supra note 71, at 251-52 (noting that in Pennsylvania the
local police seize evidence in violation of the state constitution and deliver that evidence to
the federal prosecutor for indictment and trial in the federal court). In fact, even after the
state has entered a suppression order, the state officer may bring the charges in federal
court and obtain a conviction. See United States v. Bedford, 519 F.2d 650, 654 (3d Cir.
1975) (holding that evidence suppressed by a Pennsylvania court is admissible in a federal
criminal trial), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 917 (1976).
127. Ziegler, supra note 71, at 251-52.
128. See Berman & Oberst, supra note 28, at 550 (finding that in 1960 no state that had
considered interstate silver platters excluded the evidence).
129. Several state courts have acknowledged that they lack the authority to create
stricter standards for federal law enforcement officials, even if those officials are testifying
in state court. See, e.g., State v. Mollica, 554 A.2d 1315, 1324-25 (NJ. 1989) (stating that
"[t]he essential principle underlying the development of [the] 'silver platter' doctrine is
that protections afforded by the constitution of a sovereign entity control the actions only
of the agents of that sovereign entity"); State v. Bradley, 719 P.2d 546, 549 (Wash. 1986)
(finding that "[n]either state law nor the state constitution can control federal officers'
conduct"); Sanders v. State, 469 A.2d 476, 482 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1984) (stating that
"[w]hile the standards for state law enforcement officers may be more restrictive.., than
the federal provisions, such state standards may not supersede federal law"), cert. denied,
474 A.2d 1345 (Md. 1984); see also Fisch, supra note 6, at 530 n.95 (discussing the impracti-
cability of requiring federal officers to comply with state laws). Therefore, in a joint fed-
eral-state investigation in which charges are ultimately brought in state court, the federal
officer who seizes the evidence would be bound only by federal constitutional principles.
130. Several commentators have attempted to eliminate silver platters in the fed-
eral-state context by suggesting that the federal courts follow state constitutional law. See,
e.g., Quigley, supra note 6, at 315 (stating that "[i]f the state's exclusionary rule is based on
protection of individuals, the federal court should exclude all evidence seized in violation
of the state constitution"); Range, supra note 6, at 1500 (noting that federal courts that
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C. The Effect upon Law Enforcement Cooperation and Joint Investigations
Pre-Mapp commentators noted the problems that differences in
constitutional law created for joint investigations that involved agen-
cies of different states and the federal government. These authors
documented the existence of cooperative law enforcement efforts1
3 1
and recognized that such joint investigations gave rise to a special
need for consistency in the constitutional rules that governed their
conduct.132 The Mapp Court provided this much needed consistency,
noting: "Federal-state cooperation in the solution of crime under
constitutional standards will be promoted, if only by recognition of
their now mutual obligation to respect the same fundamental criteria
in their approaches."'33
Joint investigations are much more common today than they
were in the years before Mapp. 1 4 Under a variety of arrangements,
federal and state investigators work together on a day-to-day basis on
matters of common interest. 135 To a great extent, the crime-fighting
campaign has been nationalized.' 3 6 It is ironic that, at this time of
increased cooperation, New Federalism and its resultant disparities in
refuse to excuse evidence obtained in violation of a state constitution "frustrate the right of
individual states to provide independent constitutional protection to their citzens... and
encroach upon state sovereignty and principles of federalism"). Other commentators,
however, have stated that, due to supremacy and other considerations, forcing federal
courts to conform with state law would be ill-advised and probably impossible. Fisch, supra
note 6, at 509, 520-30 (citing reasons why federal courts cannot apply state law and noting
that generally federal courts have refused to do so); Melilli, supra note 6, passim (noting the
reasons why federal courts cannot apply state law); see also infra notes 175-176 and accom-
panying text. Similarly, in the interstate situation, at least one author has suggested that
silver platter problems could be eliminated by having the state courts apply federal consti-
tutional principles in all conflict situations. Latzer, supra note 6, at 885-86. State courts
would be unwilling, however, to displace state constitutional principles with federal law in
isolated cases. Adoption of such an approach would raise serious practical problems and
constitutional concerns, including issues of equal protection and full faith and credit. See
Morrison, supra note 6, at 597-609, 635-36 (noting these problems and suggesting a
method for choosing applicable state law); see also infra notes 180-183 and accompanying
text. Thus, disparities will remain and, unavoidably, silver platters will continue to be an
integral part of New Federalism.
131. Francis A. Allen, The Supreme Court, Federalism, and State Systems of Criminal Justice, 8
DEPAUL L. REV. 213, 214-15 (1959); Kamisar, supra note 28, at 1185-90.
132. Kamisar, supra note 28, at 1191.
133. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 658 (1961).
134. In the years prior to Mapp, such arrangements were, for the most part, informal in
nature and arose periodically on a case-by-case basis. Kamisar, supra note 28, at 1187-90.
135. See Fisch, supra note 6, at 509; Melilli, supra note 6, at 734-39; The Interpretation of
State Constitutional Rights, supra note 6, at 1395.
136. Fisch, supra note 6, at 509.
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state and federal criminal procedure have generated confusion and
difficulties that severely inhibit these anti-crime efforts. 137
A simple example may be helpful to understand the magnitude
of the problem. Suppose that federal agents are working on a joint
narcotics investigation, with narcotics agents from states A, B, and C
involved in activities extending into all three states.13 8 Federal courts
and states A and B do not require a warrant or court order for the
installation of a pen register, but state C does. In fact, it is a felony in
state C to install a pen register without a court order or warrant.139
Federal courts and state A have adopted the Gates standard for prob-
able cause determinations, 40 but states B and C have retained the
more stringent Aguilar-Spinelli standard.' 4 ' The federal courts and
states A and C have adopted the Leon good faith exception to the ex-
clusionary rule, but state B has rejected this exception. 142 Federal
courts and state B permit the taking of handwriting exemplars without
court authorization, but states A and C require a warrant. 113 Federal
courts and state C permit consensual monitoring under White, but
states A and C require the consent of all parties and make it a felony
to electronically monitor conversations without the consent of all
parties1 44
Federal and state agents cannot be expected to master and com-
ply with the conflicting laws of fifty states. Under these circumstances
it would be difficult, if not impossible, for the agents to understand
and assess the effects of all of the various rules that could apply, much
less determine which rule will apply to each investigative activity.1 45
Will the court apply the constitutional law of the forum, the law of the
jurisdiction from which the seizing officer hails, federal law, the law of
the state where the act occurred, or will the decision be made on
some other basis? If the officer installs a pen register or engages in
consensual monitoring without a warrant, will the evidence be admis-
sible or will a felony prosecution be brought against the officer? In
137. Id. at 509, 530-32 (noting that New Federalism adversely affects federal-state coop-
eration and proposing remedial federal legislation); see also Melilli, supra note 6, at 734,
738-39 (observing that officers operating in a number ofjurisdictions cannot learn all the
different state constitutional principles).
138. This probably occurs with some frequency where there are several contiguous state
borders, such as the borders of Pennsylvania, West Virginia, and Ohio.
139. See supra note 92.
140. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
141. See supra note 67.
142. See supra note 78.
143. See supra note 95.
144. See supra note 84.
145. Fisch, supra note 6, at 530 n.95; Melilli, supra note 6, at 738-39.
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most cases, decisions as to where the case will be filed and what law
will apply are not made until long after an agent's activities are com-
pleted. As a result, the agents performing an investigation have no
way of knowing what principles will ultimately govern their conduct.
Therefore, they have no alternative but to speculate as to which law
will apply and take their chances. 46 Furthermore, the problems men-
tioned here are only a few of the multitude of possible issues in which
differences could arise. 147 A unitary system of constitutional rules
would eliminate the confusion and difficulties that now plague joint
interstate investigations.148
D. Choice of Law Problems
Obviously, if federal constitutional standards and the constitu-
tional standards of the various states are identical, there will never be
choice of law problems.149 If, on the other hand, federal constitu-
tional law differs from state constitutional law, the forum court will be
required to determine which constitutional standard applies. 5 ° To
some extent, this situation existed before the decision in Mapp, and
the commentators recognized and discussed these difficult issues. 51
The Mapp decision, in unifying federal and state constitutional crimi-
nal procedure regarding the exclusionary rule, eliminated these
problems. 1
5 2
146. See Melilli, supra note 6, at 731 (noting that when federal agents obtain a warrant or
take other action they do not know whether they will end up in federal or state court).
147. See supra notes 77-104 and accompanying text.
148. Agents involved in joint investigations cannot be expected to work under the most
stringent rule that may apply. First of all, federal agents cannot be expected or required to
adhere to state law because of federal supremacy considerations. Fisch, supra note 6, at
509, 520-30 (citing reasons why state laws cannot apply to federal officers); see also infra
notes 177-179 and accompanying text. Similarly, if state officers followed the laws of an-
other state with regard to citizens of their own state, serious constitutional considerations,
including equal protection, arise. See Morrison, supra note 6, at 597-609, 635-36 (noting
these problems and suggesting a method for choosing applicable state law); see also infra
notes 180-183 and accompanying text. Furthermore, it would be unrealistic and perhaps
impossible to expect the participating officers and judicial officials not only to be ac-
quainted with all of the constitutional principles involved, but also to calculate all of the
combinations and permutations, and then determine the most stringent rule. In most
circumstances the determination of the most stringent rule may be impossible. Finally, the
state judges and magistrates who review search warrants, wiretap orders, and other investi-
gative procedures, may refuse to require that the more stringent rules of other states be
applied, or that additional judicial process be issued in order to comply with the more
stringent standards of another state.
149. See Fisch, supra note 6, at 519-20.
150. Id. at 520-30 (noting that choice of law problems arise when there is a splintering of
the jurisprudence such as that caused by New Federalism).
151. See generally supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text.
152. See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text.
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With the disparities inherent in New Federalism, choice of law
issues have reemerged and created complicated and perplexing
problems in both federal-state and interstate situations. These issues
have given rise to one of the most nettlesome problems of New Feder-
alism. Although these difficult issues have been the subject of exten-
sive debate, they seem almost impossible to resolve.1
53
On the federal level, based on federal supremacy principles and
other considerations, it might be expected that federal constitutional
precepts would control in all cases. That has, in fact, been the posi-
tion taken by many scholars and most federal courts. 5 4 However, for
several reasons, including the amelioration of silver platter problems,
a few commentators have advocated that federal judges apply state
constitutional principles, especially to state officers who are testifying
in federal court.'55
153. Fisch, supra note 6, at 509, 522 n.65, 530 n.95 (asserting that state standards cannot
be applied to federal officers); Latzer, supra note 6, at 871-84 (noting the difficulty of
choice of law problems in interstate situations and suggesting federal law be applied); Me-
lilli, supra note 6, passim (suggesting that federal courts not apply state law in federal cases);
Morrison, supra note 6, at 579-87, 597-632 (discussing the difficult nature of interstate
choice of law problems and suggesting a displacement analysis/better law approach); Zie-
gler, supra note 71, at 253-54 (suggesting a balancing test to determine whether a federal
court should apply federal or state standards); Quigley, supra note 6, at 315, 323 (recom-
mending that federal courts apply state standards to state officials testifying in federal
court, and that in interstate cases evidence should be excluded if inadmissible under the
standards of the state where the investigation took place); Range, supra note 6. at 1500-01,
1513-25 (suggesting that federal courts should apply state law to actions of state officers
testifying in federal court).
154. See, e.g., United States v. Hall, 543 F.2d 1229 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1075 (1977). In Ha/l, the court stated: "In the absence of any federal violation, therefore,
we are not required to exclude the challenged material [evidence obtained in compliance
with federal law but in violation of state standards]; the bounds of admissibility of evidence
for federal courts are not ordinarily subject to determination by the states." Id. at 1235; see
also Melilli, supra note 6, at 669, 724, 739 (stating that federal courts should apply only
federal standards and observing that generally federal courts have refused to apply state
standards); Range, supra note 6, at 1500, 1511 (noting that federal courts generally refuse
to exclude evidence seized by state officers in violation of state standards if no federal
violation exists).
155. Ziegler, supra note 71, at 253-54 (proposing that federal courts apply a balancing of
interests test to determine whether state standards should be applied); Quigley, supra note
6, at 315 (suggesting that federal courts apply a balancing of interests test to determine
whether state standards should be applied); Range, supra note 6, at 1500-01, 1513-25 (argu-
ing that federal courts should exclude evidence seized by state officers in violation of their
state constitution); see also United States v. Henderson, 721 F.2d 662, 665 (9th Cir. 1983)
(dictum) (suggesting that state standards could be applied), cert. denied; 467 U.S. 1218
(1984); United States v. Speaks, 649 F. Supp. 1065, 1070 (E.D. Wash. 1986) (excluding
evidence from a federal prosecution in which state officers seized evidence in violation of
their state constitution).
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The difficulties in the federal context pale in comparison to the
complex and seemingly insoluble choice of law problems that arise in
state court situations. Because of the disparities between federal and
state constitutional standards, choice of law problems will inevitably
arise when federal officers or the officers of another state appear in
state court. In regard to federal officers' testimony, many state courts
have decided that they are without authority to apply state constitu-
tional standards to actions of federal officials.15 Their conclusions
have been based on a number of considerations, including federal
supremacy. 157 However, other courts and commentators have
reached the opposite conclusion. 158 These issues become more com-
plicated in interstate cases that involve the testimony of officers from
other states. 15 9
Compelling reasons may exist not to apply the law of the forum,
but the failure to do so can also lead to problems. If a state court does
156. See, e.g., Basham v. Commonwealth, 675 S.W.2d 376, 379 (Ky. 1984) (holding that
federal officers conducting an eavesdropping operation pursuant to a valid federal wiretap
order are not in violation of Kentucky state law), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1050 (1985); State v.
O'Neill, 700 P.2d 711, 720 (Wash. 1985) (en banc) (observing that the Supreme Court of
Washington has never suggested that evidence obtained by federal authorities acting in
strict accordance with federal standards was illegal).
157. See, e.g., Sanders v. State, 469 A.2d 476, 482 (Md. CL Spec. App.) (noting that in
resolving conflicts between enactments of Congress and the states, the Supremacy Clause
mandates that federal enactments govern), cei. denied, 474 A.2d 1345 (Md. 1984); State v.
Mollica, 554 A.2d 1315, 1327 (N.J. 1989) (observing that when federal officers act pursuant
to federal authority, state courts treat them as officers from another jurisdiction, and state
constitutions do not control their actions); State v. Bradley, 719 P.2d 546, 549 (Wash.
1986) (noting that neither state law nor state constitutions can control the conduct of
federal officials); see Fisch, supra note 6, at 509, 522-23, 530 n.95 (suggesting that, due to
supremacy and other considerations, state courts lack authority to apply state standards to
federal officers, and pointing out that most state courts have so held).
158. See People v. Griminger, 524 N.E.2d 409, 412 (N.Y. 1988) (applying state constitu-
tional standards to federal officers testifying in state court since the defendant was tried for
crimes defined by state penal law); Quigley, supra note 6, at 319-20 (suggesting that evi-
dence seized by federal officers testifying in state court should be subject to state constitu-
tional standards).
159. Fisch, supra note 6, at 522-23 (noting the complexity of interstate situations);
Latzer, supra note 6, at 869-86 (noting the complexity of interstate situations and sug-
gesting that federal law be applied in cases of conflicts); Morrison, supra note 6, at 579-87,
609-32, 635-36 (noting the perplexing problems associated with interstate situations and
proposing a displacement analysis/better law approach). In addition, interstate situations
implicate difficult and important constitutional issues including equal protection, full faith
and credit, and privileges and immunities. See Morrison, supra note 6, at 597-609.
This complexity is evidenced by Latzer's illustration of six types of situations involving
variations in the employer of agents, situs of investigations, and breadth of the exclusionary
rule. Latzer, supra note 6, at 871-77. In an apparent effort to reach a solution, Latzer
proposed that the federal standard be applied to all such situations. Id. at 885. This, how-
ever, presents a number of serious problems. For other alternatives to this problem, see
supra note 153.
[VOL. 55:223252
NEW FEDERALISM AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
not apply its more stringent state standards to federal officers, simi-
larly situated state defendants will be treated differently, the admissi-
bility of evidence will be determined by the badge of the officer rather
than the legality of the act, and silver platter abuses will be en-
couraged. Similar problems develop in interstate situations where the
court may choose to apply the law of another state. These were ex-
actly the injustices noted by pre-Mapp authors16° that led to the
Court's decision in Mapp. Constitutional criminal procedure has
come full circle. The debate as to what law should apply has been
joined, and because the United States Supreme Court and the court
of each state will have to reach independent conclusions on a wide
variety of issues, the controversy will no doubt intensify over time.
E. Increase in Litigation
In a unified system of constitutional criminal procedure each is-
sue usually will be resolved finally by the United States Supreme
Court. Under New Federalism, however, every state is at liberty to
reach a different conclusion. As a result, an issue will not be finally
resolved until all of the highest state courts and the United States
Supreme Court have decided the issue. This will require substantially
more litigation than was necessary under a unified system. Rather
than requiring that a single case be adjudicated in the federal system
to resolve an issue, at least fifty additional cases will have to proceed
through the courts of the various states.' 61 Considering the multitude
of potential issues that will need resolution,'62 New Federalism could
lead to a dramatic increase in state court litigation.
Increases in litigation will also result from the ability of criminal
defense attorneys who practice in state courts to seek relief upon two
distinct grounds. They can base their claims on both the federal and
state constitutional standards. Even if the issue is clearly resolved
against the accused under federal law, a defendant can still seek relief
under the state constitution and appeal that determination to the
160. In 1959 Professor Kamisar wrote:
For.... so long as that doctrine holds sway there is no "uniform" treatment of
illegally seized evidence in federal criminal trials. Presently, there is one rule for
federally-seized evidence, another for state-seized. Apparently, then, in search
and seizure cases the federal courts can take cognizance of distinct types of fact
situations other than those which bear on the legality or illegality of the search
itself, e.g., the jurisdiction from which the searching police hail.
Kamisar, supra note 28, at 1163 n.268 (citation omitted).
161. See Latzer, supra note 6, at 865 (noting that standards are not finally determined
until all 50 states have decided the issues).
162. See supra notes 77-105 and accompanying text.
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highest state court. Not only do defense attorneys have these argu-
ments available to them, judicial officials and scholars are encourag-
ing them to raise every possible state constitutional issue in every
case.1" 3 Indeed, it has been suggested that their failure to do so may
constitute malpractice.' As a result, in every state case every poten-
tial state constitutional issue most likely will be raised by a suppression
motion or some other claim for relief, and in each case the determina-
tion on each issue will then be appealed to the highest court of the
state. This process will continue until all of the potential issues are
decided. Thereafter, as on the federal level, additional state litigation
will be required to determine the retroactivity of the decisions, as well
as to explain, refine, explicate, and delineate each of the courts'
conclusions.
New Federalism will lead to additional litigation in other areas as
well. Numerous constitutional and choice of law issues will arise from
the disparities among federal and state constitutional standards.16
New Federalism has already created needless litigation in the United
States Supreme Court. A number of cases decided by the Court have
been remanded to the highest court in the state, only to have that
court reach the opposite conclusion on state constitutional
grounds.166 This practice leads to even more litigation, because it en-
courages litigants who lose in the United States Supreme Court to
163. See Brennan, supra note 6, at 502 (advocating that criminal defense lawyers in state
cases raise state constitutional issues); Melilli, supra note 6, at 688-89 (noting that state
criminal defendants have two bites at the apple and that the defense bar has been en-
couraged to raise state constitutional arguments); Ziegler, supra note 71, at 244, 249 (en-
couraging criminal defense lawyers in state cases to raise state constitutional issues).
164. "Any defense lawyer who fails to raise an Oregon Constitution violation and relies
solely on parallel provisions under the federal constitution, except to exert federal limita-
tions, should be guilty of legal malpractice." State v. Lowry, 667 P.2d 996, 1013 (Or. 1983)
(en banc) (Jones, J., concurring specially).
165. See supra notes 149-160 and accompanying text; infra notes 169-183 and accompany-
ing text.
166. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Upton, 476 N.E.2d 548, 559 (Mass. 1985) (finding that
search of mobile home violated the Massachusetts Constitution after the United States
Supreme Court, in Massachusetts v. Upton, 466 U.S. 727, 734 (1984), held that the search
did not offend the federal Constitution); Sitz v. Department of State Police, 506 N.W.2d
209, 225 (Mich. 1993) (holding that an automobile checkpoint to detect drunken drivers
violates the Michigan Constitution after the United States Supreme Court, in Michigan
Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 455 (1990), held that such checkpoints did not
violate the federal Constitution); State v. Opperman, 247 N.W.2d 673, 674 (S.D. 1976)
(finding that an inventory search of a vehicle violated the South Dakota Constitution after
the United States Supreme Court had found, in South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364,
376 (1976), that the search did not offend the federal Constitution); State v. Chrisman,
676 P.2d 419, 424 (Wash. 1984) (holding that a police officer's action in following an
arrested suspect into a room violated the Washington Constitution after the United States
Supreme Court held, in Washington v. Chrisman, 455 U.S. 1, 7 (1982), that such police
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seek remand and reconsideration by the state court.167 New Federal-
ism has even opened the door to relitigating issues in federal court
that have already been decided on the state level.
168
F. Federal Constitutional Implications
In the years before Mapp, it was recognized that the differences
between federal and state constitutional law could lead to supremacy
issues and other federal constitutional problems, and it was noted that
federal law would control where conflicts arose.169 These problems
were eliminated by the unifying effect of the Mapp decision.1 7° The
conflicts created by New Federalism have led to a reemergence of fed-
eral constitutional problems involving federal supremacy,' 7' equal
protection,171 privileges and immunities, 17 and full faith and
credit.1
74
1. Federal Level.-New Federalism requires the federal courts to
deal with difficult supremacy issues. A few commentators have sug-
gested that silver platter abuses could be curbed or even eliminated if
federal courts would apply state constitutional standards in federal
action did not violate the federal Constitution); see also The Interpretation of State Constitu-
tions! Rights, supra note 6, at 1389-90 (discussing retroactive incorporation).
167. The possibility of appeal to the United States Supreme Court could be averted if, in
the first instance, the highest court in the state would clearly decide the case on the basis of
state constitutional rights. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1041 (1983). However, it
would appear that at least some state courts prefer to resolve only the federal issues and
address the state constitutional issues on remand after the United States Supreme Court
has decided the case. See cases cited supra note 166.
168. See United States v. Bedford, 519 F.2d 650, 654 (3d Cir. 1975) (affirming a federal
conviction based on evidence previously suppressed by a state court on the basis of its state
constitutional standards), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 917 (1976). Similar results are possible in
virtually all situations involving disparate treatment, including cases involving electronic
surveillance, search warrants, and confessions.
169. Parsons, supra note 28, at 363, 370-72.
170. See supra notes 47-63 and accompanying text.
171. Article VI of the Constitution provides in pertinent part: "This Constitution, and
the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof;.., shall be the
supreme Law of the Land; and the judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing
in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." U.S. CONST. art.
VI, cl. 2; see supra notes 157-158 and accompanying text.
172. The Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution provides in pertinent part: "No
State shall.., deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; see Morrison, supra note 6, at 606-07.
173. Article IV of the Constitution provides: "The Citizens of each State shall be entitled
to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States." U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2,
cl. 1; see Morrison, supra note 6, at 607-09.
174. Article IV of the Constitution provides in pertinent part: "Full Faith and Credit
shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every
other State .... " U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1, cl. 1; see Morrison, supra note 6, at 597-606.
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cases, especially when state officers are testifying in federal court.17 5
Nonetheless, federal courts rather consistently have held that
supremacy considerations, under all circumstances, compel them to
apply federal constitutional standards.' 76 Indeed, their failure to do
so could result in different treatment of similarly situated federal de-
fendants, and this in turn could lead to equal protection problems.
2. State Level.-Federal constitutional issues also arise on the
state level. New Federalism has spawned a number of federal
supremacy problems, particularly when state courts are considering
the actions of federal agents. In an effort to eliminate disparate treat-
ment and silver platter injustices, some authorities have sought to
hold federal officers to state constitutional standards when they are
testifying in state court.177 Most courts and commentators, however,
have held that states are without authority to control the actions of
federal officials. a71 This conclusion leads to other problems. The re-
sulting disparate treatment of similarly situated state criminal defend-
ants raises equal protection concerns. These issues become quite
complicated when federal and state law enforcement officers ex-
change information, for example, when state officials use information
obtained by federal agents to obtain state search warrants. 179
In interstate cases, New Federalism gives rise to a number of fed-
eral constitutional issues. When an officer of one state attempts to
introduce evidence in the court of another state, that court must de-
cide whether it will apply the constitutional standards of the forum,
175. See supra note 155.
176. See supra note 154.
177. See supra note 158.
178. "Stated simply, state constitutions do not control federal action." State v. Mollica,
554 A.2d 1315, 1327 (N.J. 1989). "Neither state law nor the state constitution can control
federal officers' conduct." State v. Bradley, 719 P.2d 546, 549 (Wash. 1986); see also Sand-
ers v. State, 469 A.2d 476, 482 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.) (contending that states may not create
more stringent standards for federal officers), cert. denied, 474 A.2d 1345 (Md. 1984);
Basham v. Commonwealth, 675 S.W.2d 376, 379 (Ky. 1984) (holding that, because of
supremacy considerations, Kentucky cannot render federal officers' wiretap unlawful if it is
lawful under federal law), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1050 (1985); Fisch, supra note 6, at 509, 522,
530 n.95 (suggesting that, due to supremacy and other considerations, state courts lack
authority to apply state standards to federal officers and noting that most state'courts have
reached the same conclusion). At least one pre-Mapp commentator recognized that in
conflicts between state and federal courts, the differences between state and federal consti-
tutional standards could lead to supremacy questions. Parsons, supra note 28, at 363.
179. See, e.g., State v. O'Neill, 700 P.2d 711, 720 (Wash. 1985) (en banc) (upholding the
validity of a state court order authorizing electronic surveillance by state officers when the
issuance of the order was based on information obtained by federal officers using consen-
sual monitoring that would have been unlawful under state law); see also Fisch, supra note 6,
at 528-29 (noting the difficult issues presented by these situations).
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the state from which the officer hails, or the state where the evidence
was seized. One commentator has even suggested that federal stan-
dards should be applied in all interstate situations.' ° These determi-
nations implicate a number of important federal constitutional issues
in addition to federal supremacy, including full faith and credit,"8 '
equal protection,' and privileges and immunities. 8 ' The constitu-
tional protections afforded by these guarantees may lead to further
conflicts that are not easily resolved.
G. The Unreasonable Consequences of New Federalism
The pre-Mapp experience demonstrates that the absence of uni-
formity can lead to unfortunate and unreasonable results.' 84 The dis-
parities reintroduced into the jurisprudence by New Federalism have,
once again, led to a number of consequences that are illogical, unrea-
sonable, and, in some cases, totally unjust.
Silver platters have returned in both the federal-state and inter-
state contexts. Accompanying the silver platters have been the ineluc-
table and intolerable consequences that both pre-Mapp and modern
scholars have criticized.' 85 Law enforcement agents can, as in pre-
Mapp days, evade constitutional strictures merely by taking the case to
another forum;i8 6 different treatment can be accorded to similarly sit-
uated defendants in the same courtroom based solely on the identity
of the officer who recovered the evidence; 187 and officials can now
obtain a federal conviction based on evidence that was previously sup-
pressed by a state court.' 8
180. Latzer, supra note 6, at 885-86.
181. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1; see supra note 174. This issue concerns whether, in inter-
state situations, the forum state is compelled by the federal Full Faith and Credit Clause to
apply the constitutional law of the situs state. For a full explication of this issue, see Morri-
son, supra note 6, at 597-606.
182. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; see supra note 172. This question involves many of the
same constitutional and practical considerations as the full faith and credit issue. Depend-
ing on the constitutional standards that are applied in individual cases, similarly situated
defendants in the same state court could be treated differently. For a discussion of this
issue, see Morrison, supra note 6, at 606-07.
183. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1; see supra note 173. This issue could possibly arise in a
situation involving disparate treatment, such as where forum residents are afforded privacy
rights that are not provided to nonresidents. For a full discussion of these issues, see Mor-
rison, supra note 6, at 607-09.
184. See supra notes 8-42, 110-112 and accompanying text.
185. See supra notes 124-130 and accompanying text.
186. See supra note 126.
187. See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
188. See United States v. Bedford, 519 F.2d 650, 654 (3d Cir. 1975) (affirming a federal
conviction resulting from the admission of evidence that had previously been suppressed
by a state court under its state constitution), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 917 (1976).
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Silver platters are not the only unreasonable consequences of
New Federalism. It is illogical to embrace an approach in which the
highest courts of each of the fifty states and the United States
Supreme Court must reach independent and conflicting decisions on
a multitude of issues, rather than to retain a unified system in which
the debate on each issue is put to rest by one decision from the
Court.189 It is unreasonable to expect federal agents who are moving
around the country and operating in a number of states to master the
complex labyrinth of constitutional law that may develop in each
state.1 90 It is impractical, in interstate or federal situations, to require
state justices of the peace who review police conduct to know all the
different constitutional principles in contiguous states as well as the
federal standards.191 Scholars have noted that federal law enforce-
ment officers cannot be expected to be prescient regarding the law
that will ultimately be applied to their investigative actions.192 But
that is exactly what is demanded of them when, after the fact, they are
notified for the first time that their actions will be judged by more
stringent state standards.193
New Federalism has led to other results that appear patently un-
just. For example, under federal double jeopardy principles, a crimi-
nal defendant who is acquitted on the state level may be retried and
convicted in federal court,1 94 but a number of states have now inter-
preted their constitutions to bar retrial in state court after a federal
acquittal.1 95 As a result, a defendant first tried in federal court will
189. See Latzer, supra note 6, at 865.
190. See Fisch, supra note 6, at 530 n.95.
191. See supra notes 148, 154-160 and accompanying text.
192. Fisch, supra note 6, at 530 n.95; Melilli, supra note 6, at 731.
193. People v. Griminger, 524 N.E.2d 409 (N.Y. 1988) (holding that state constitutional
standards would govern federal officers testifying in state court even if the investigative
action was approved by a federal judicial official); see also Quigley, supra note 6, at 319-20
(suggesting that evidence seized by federal officers testifying in state court should be sub-
ject to state constitutional standards). At the time that the investigation takes place, the
federal officer has every reason to believe that the case will be brought in federal court. In
addition, all investigative actions are, at the time, reviewed by federal judicial officials who
apply federal standards. Only after the investigation is completed and the defendant is
arrested is the decision made by the prosecutors to bring the charges in state court.
194. Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 132-33 (1959) (noting that, under the federal Con-
stitution, successive state and federal prosecutions do not constitute violations of the
Double Jeopardy Clause).
195. People v. Cooper, 247 N.W.2d 866, 870 (Mich. 1976) (holding that, under the
Michigan Constitution, a second prosecution by anotherjurisdiction will be permitted only
if the interests of the State of Michigan and the jurisdiction that initially prosecuted are
substantially different); State v. Hogg, 385 A.2d 844, 847 (N.H. 1978) (holding that succes-
sive prosecutions in federal and state court are barred under the New Hampshire Constitu-
tion); Commonwealth v. Mills, 286 A.2d 638, 642 (Pa. 1971) (holding that a second
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not be subject to retrial in state court, but another defendant who is
first tried and acquitted in state court can be retried and convicted on
the federal level. Thus, the double jeopardy protections afforded to
individual defendants will depend on where they are tried first, a de-
termination that is, in almost all cases, made by the prosecutors. Simi-
larly unforeseen and unreasonable consequences may emerge in the
future as the disparities arising from New Federalism increase in
number and effect.
V. FEDERAL AND STATE REACTION TO NEW FEDERALISM
In the twenty years since the emergence of New Federalism, there
have been significant developments in the area of constitutional crimi-
nal procedure. Based on supremacy grounds and other considera-
tions, federal courts have almost unanimously held that under no
circumstances will they apply state constitutional standards in federal
proceedings. 196 For similar reasons, state courts generally have con-
cluded that they will not apply state standards to federal officers oper-
ating within their jurisdiction.19 In regard to cases based on state
constitutional claims, most state courts have remained in lockstep with
the development of federal constitutional principles, thus preserving a
unified approach to these issues.1 98 Courts in a growing number of
states, however, are adopting the tenets of New Federalism on a
widening variety of issues."' Certain states, such as NewJersey, Penn-
sylvania, Massachusetts, Hawaii, and Alaska, have been particularly ac-
tive in this area. 0
prosecution and imposition of punishment for the same offense violates the Pennsylvania
Constitution unless the interests of Pennsylvania and the jurisdiction that initially prose-
cuted differ substantially).
196. See supra notes 154-155 and accompanying text.
197. See supra notes 157-158 and accompanying text.
198. See Gardner, supra note 6, at 788-93, 804 (noting that, in many cases, state courts
interpret those state constitutions to provide the same rights as the federal Constitution);
The Interpretation of State Constitutional Rights, supra note 6, at 1368, 1388 (observing that
state courts commonly interpret state constitutional criminal protections as the precise
equivalents of the corresponding federal rights).
199. See generally The Interpretation of State Constitutional Rights, supra note 6, at 1368-69
(noting that as the Burger Court limited the reach of several of the broader Warren Court
decisions, state courts gradually relied on their own state constitutions to expand the scope
of criminal procedural rights).
200. See supra note 76. It appears that the Supreme Court will not review a state court
decision based on an interpretation of the state constitution if the state court clearly an-
nounces that its decision rests on independent state grounds. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S.
1032, 1038-42 (1983). For a discussion of the inability to appeal state constitutional deci-
sions resting upon adequate, independent state grounds, see Brennan, supra note 6, at 501.
Galie, supra note 6, at 732; Gardner, supra note 6, at 775; Wilkes, supra note 6, at 430-31;
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The expansion of New Federalism has met with some resistance.
State courts have voiced opposition to the approach on policy
grounds.2 1' Even more significant are the legislative and constitu-
tional initiatives limiting the authority of state courts to diverge from
federal standards. At least two states have enacted constitutional
amendments requiring that their constitutions be interpreted in con-
formity with the federal Constitution, and other states have taken ac-
tions having a similar effect in specific situations.20 Nonetheless, it
appears clear that, at least in the immediate future, the doctrine of
New Federalism will continue to expand and flourish.
VI. THE FUTURE OF CONSTITUTIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
The vicissitudes of constitutional criminal procedure make accu-
rate predictions in this area extremely difficult, if not impossible. The
lessons of history, however, may be helpful in attempting to determine
where the development of New Federalism may take this jurispru-
dence in the coming years.
The continued expansion of the New Federalism into new states
and into new issues will lead to even more disparities in the law of
constitutional criminal procedure. These will include differences be-
tween federal and state standards and the standards applied by the
various states on a wide variety of issues."°3 Similar differences devel-
oped in the almost fifty years between Weeks and Mapp and eventually
led to a number of serious problems including silver platters, choice
of law issues, increased litigation, impediments to joint investigations,
constitutional questions, and other consequences that were questiona-
ble on both a theoretical and practical level.2" 4 Near the end of this
period, courts were even issuing injunctions to prevent officers from
Ziegler, supra note 71, at 242; The Interpreation of State Constitutional Rights, supra note 6, at
1332, 1369.
201. For example, the Arizona Supreme Court in State v. Bolt stated: "We believe . . .
that one of the few things worse than a single exclusionary rule is two different exclusion-
ary rules.... It is poor judicial policy for rules governing the suppression of evidence to
differ depending upon whether the defendant is arrested by federal or state officers." 689
P.2d 519, 527-28 (Ariz. 1984). Commentators have also espoused the need for uniformity.
See Fisch, supra note 6, at 516-19; Melilli, supra note 6, at 736.
202. Both Florida and California have enacted such provisions. See CAL. CONST. art. I,
§ 28(d); FLA. CONST. art. I, § 12; see also Gardner, supra note 6, at 790 n.119 (discussing the
California constitutional provision and its effects); Melilli, supra note 6, at 687-88 n.102
(reviewing the Florida and California provisions and their effects); Morrison, supra note 6,
at 633-34 (discussing Florida, California, and a similar action in Pennsylvania, and pointing
out that Maryland has repealed a statute providing enhanced protection).
203. See supra notes 77-105 and accompanying text.
204. See supra notes 16-42, 110-112, 122-124, 131-133, 149-152, 169, 185 and accompany-
ing text.
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testifying in the courts of other jurisdictions.2" 5 After almost fifty
years, these problems reached a critical point and the United States
Supreme Court concluded that there was only one solution-a return
to a unified system of constitutional criminal procedure. The Court
did so in Mapp.
2 6
As a result of New Federalism, constitutional criminal procedure
jurisprudence is once again in the process of fragmenting. Certainly,
differences exist between this process and events during the years
before Mapp, but the effects are remarkably similar. Problems with
silver platters, choice of law issues, increased litigation, impediments
to joint investigations, constitutional questions, and other questiona-
ble consequences are again being encountered.2" 7 The differences
between New Federalism and the situation that existed before Mapp
make the present problems, if anything, even more complex and per-
plexing than those encountered during that time.2 0 8
Virtually all of these difficulties arise from the disparities among
federal and state constitutional principles. As a result, the ultimate
success or failure of New Federalism may depend upon our ability to
minimize the effects of this dissimilar treatment or to eliminate it en-
tirely. Because of supremacy concerns and other considerations, elim-
ination of these differences is unlikely.2°9 Unfortunately, the
prospects for effectively ameliorating the detrimental effects of New
Federalism likewise appear dim. 10
As New Federalism's precepts are adopted by more states with
regard to more issues, the problems will only get worse. The use of
silver platters, choice of law issues, constitutional problems, difficulties
forjoint investigations, and related litigation will continue to increase,
205. See supra notes 21-27 and accompanying text.
206. See supra notes 1, 4, 43-62 and accompanying text.
207. See supra notes 109-195 and accompanying text.
208. By comparison, the pre-Mapp era involved more limited issues and fewer complica-
tions than those presented by New Federalism. Weeks and Mapp involved only the Fourth
Amendment exclusionary rule, while New Federalism involves an almost unlimited
number of constitutional issues that must each be litigated in the courts of every state. In
the pre-Mapp era, the issues involved absolutes. Federal courts were bound by the exclu-
sionary rule, and the states were at liberty to adopt or reject the rule on the state level.
Today, states develop constitutional principles that can differ to varying degrees, not only
from the federal standards, but also from the standards of the other states. In the years
before Mapp, the federal government was subject to the more stringent standards, and this
gave rise to few, if any, supremacy issues. Under New Federalism, the states have the more
stringent standards, which lead to a number of complex supremacy considerations. See
supra notes 169-179 and accompanying text.
209. See supra notes 169-183 and accompanying text.
210. The problems presented by New Federalism are even more complex than those
that developed prior to Mapp. See supra note 208 and accompanying text.
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possibly at an alarming rate. States may take unacceptable measures
to give effect to their constitutional principles,2 1 ' and, as in the years
before Mapp, courts may issue injunctions to prevent officers from tes-
tifying in the courts of other jurisdictions. 2
As these problems develop and worsen, more and more states
may follow the lead of Florida and California and adopt state constitu-
tional provisions that require a unified approach to constitutional
criminal procedure. 1 Federal courts may, on supremacy grounds,
take steps to protect the independence of federal officers,2 14 and Con-
gress could take legislative action to achieve the same result.2 1 5 If the
problems created by the disparities in constitutional principles again.
reach a critical level, even more drastic measures may ensue. The
United States Supreme Court could possibly abrogate or modify the
"adequate state grounds rule"1 6 and hold that federal and state con-
stitutional standards must be the same.2 17 It is even possible that Con-
211. States have already taken similar measures to protect state interests in other areas.
For example, Missouri has enacted statutes limiting the ability of state officers to turn over
forfeitable property to the federal government- See Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 513.647, .649, .653
(Vernon Supp. 1995). Such statutes raise serious issues of federal supremacy and present
difficult practical problems in joint federal-state investigations.
212. Under New Federalism such injunctions would, for the most part, presumably arise
in situations where a state court is enjoining an officer of that state from testifying in fed-
eral court or in the court of another state. In regard to injunctions enjoining testimony in
federal court, one gets the impression that we are reliving history. In 1957, before the
1961 decision in Mapp v. Ohio, one commentator wrote:
Some of the state courts which have followed Weeks may attempt to solve this
problem themselves by also following Rea. But here a state court would run afoul
of the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution. If a state court enjoined a state
officer from testifying in a federal court and a federal court ordered him to tes-
tify, obviously the federal court would have to win such a tug of war.
Parsons, supra note 28, at 363 (footnote omitted). Due to supremacy concerns, however, it
is conceivable that a federal court could order a state court to apply federal standards to a
federal officer testifying in state court. Similar federal court orders could require state
judicial officers issuing federal search warrants pursuant to rule 41 (a), FED. R. CriM. P., to
apply federal standards. Cf supra notes 157-158, 177-178, 200 and accompanying text.
213. See supra note 202.
214. See supra note 212.
215. See Fisch, supra note 6, at 531-32 (proposing federal legislation to ensure that en-
forcement efforts of federal officers are not impeded by state constitutional standards).
216. See supra notes 75, 200.
217. Wilkes, supra note 6, at 448-50. Although at present this appears unlikely, it is a
possible course of action if the problems caused by New Federalism reach a critical stage.
As Professor Wilkes noted, this could be accomplished by either eliminating the adequate
state ground rule entirely, or reinterpreting the rule. In the latter case, the Court could
establish its right to review by holding that the rule is not jurisdictional, decide that a
federal question is created because similar state and federal provisions must be construed
similarly, or relax the rule based on the conclusion that the state court has been motivated
by an "illegitimate" desire to evade the Court. Id.; see also The Interpretation of State Constitu-
tional Rights, supra note 6, at 1339 n.42 (noting that federal courts could apply the preemp-
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gress could enact federal legislation requiring a unified approach to
constitutional criminal procedure.2 18 Although it is very unlikely that
these actions will be taken,2 19 these possibilities do deserve mention.
CONCLUSION
During the period between the United States Supreme Court's
decisions in Weeks and Mapp, differences developed among federal
and state constitutional principles. As these differences increased in
number and importance, the resulting conflicts created very serious
and, in some cases, seemingly insoluble problems for law enforcement
officials. As these problems increased in number and severity, schol-
ars and the Court recognized the urgent need to restore consistency
to constitutional criminal procedure on the federal and state levels.
The Court answered this need in Mapp.
The advent of New Federalism has led to a reemergence of con-
flicts among federal and state constitutional standards. The resulting
problems resemble those that developed in the years before Mapp,
and are, if anything, even greater in number and more difficult to
solve. Over time these problems will continue to increase in number
and severity.
New Federalism may, as a matter of legal philosophy, be a
favorable or unfavorable development. One's views on the issue may
be largely dictated by one's personal convictions. It is indisputable,
however, that the conflicts created by this approach give rise to net-
tlesome issues and problems, many of which have been confronted
before and found to be difficult, if not impossible, to solve. These
problems would, quite obviously, be eliminated immediately if consis-
tency were restored between federal and state jurisprudence. How-
ever, states have never been required to limit themselves to the federal
standard or follow the standards of other states.
It is quite clear that New Federalism and disparate treatment will
be with us for the foreseeable future. The states that have embraced
New Federalism will certainly not voluntarily return to the federal
standard, and federal courts will not, and perhaps cannot, follow the
don doctrine to the elaboration of state constitutional law, particularly in those
circumstances when federal doctrine is shaped by competing federal rights or a uniform
national standard would be especially valuable).
218. See The Interpretation of State Constitutional Rights, supra note 6, at 1338 (noting that
supremacy establishes the same precedence over state constitutional law for federal legisla-
tion that it establishes for the federal Constitution); see also Morrison, supra note 6, at 632-
33 (noting the possibility of congressional action to unify federal and state constitutional
standards).
219. See infra note 221.
1996] 263
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
standards set by the individual states. 2 ' Nor is there any likelihood
that harmony will be restored by congressional action or rulings of the
United States Supreme Court.
22 1
As a result, courts will be required to maintain the integrity of
New Federalism while making every effort to mitigate the potentially
disastrous effects of disparate treatment. It will not be an easy task.
The courts can take steps to ameliorate the problems created by New
Federalism, but they can do so only if they understand the nature and
seriousness of the difficulties created by the existence of differing
standards. Judges who are well acquainted with these issues will, in
individual cases, be in a position to understand the practical effects of
their rulings, provide guidance on how to deal with the problems, and
frame their decisions in a manner best calculated to minimize the dif-
ficulties created by disparate treatment. It is hoped that this Article
will be of some assistance in that regard. The courts must also be
aware that we have trod this road before and keep in mind the oft-
quoted words of George Santayana: "Those who cannot remember
the past are condemned to repeat it."2
2 2
220. See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
221. Although it has been suggested by commentators that these possibilities exist, see
supra notes 217-218, it is virtually certain that such steps will not be taken. Congress will
not, as a political matter, be inclined to intervene, and the Supreme Court's recognition of
New Federalism is firmly entrenched in its jurisprudence. See supra notes 75, 200. More
important, such actions would involve an attack on the basic tenets of federalism and could
raise serious Tenth Amendment questions. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
222. GEORGE SANTAYANA, 1 THE LIFE OF REASON 284 (1905).
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